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THE UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

Einführung in Performance

by



Jane W. O'Dea

A Thesis

Submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and
Research in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements for
the Degree of Master of Education

in

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THE UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA
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The undersigned certify that they have read, and recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research, for acceptance, a thesis entitled Einfuhlung in Performance submitted by Jane O'Dea in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Education in the field of The Philosophy of Education.

For Bridget

ABSTRACT

While many aesthetic theories deal with creativity as it applies to musical composition, few of them deal with that other aspect of musical creativity -- performance.

It is argued that one theory -- the theory of *Einfuhlung* -- has particular relevance. *Einfuhlung*, "the act whereby we bestow on things our own soul and its moods", provides a satisfactory explanation for the creative dimension which the performer brings to musical composition.

Focusing on the notion of creative musical performance first, chapter one explores the "ideals" of musical performance seeking to understand them from the average performer's point of view.

Having explored the "ideals" of music in performance, chapter two focuses on the theory of "*Einfuhlung*", seeking to outline and critically understand its central ideas. Here, it becomes clear that *Einfuhlung*, far from being wholly subjective, as the definition above might seem to suggest, instead focuses a great deal of attention on the aesthetic object -- in the case of music in performance, the musical composition. Moreover, it sets up specific conditions which the structures of art works such as music compositions must exhibit, if an act of *Einfuhlung* is to occur.

Chapter three explores one of the most important of these conditions -- the notion that musical compositions are capable of expressing emotion. Here, the theory that musical compositions symbolize emotive life is carefully examined and its significance both for musical performance and for the theory of Einfuhlung is outlined.

Chapter four explores another important structural condition -- the notion of musical compositions exhibiting the structural characteristics of Organic Form. Here, again, the significance of this notion both for Einfuhlung theory and musical performance is carefully examined.

In chapter five, having summarized the central ideas of the previous chapters, it is argued that creative musical performance may indeed be explained in terms of an act of Einfuhlung.

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I. MUSIC IN PERFORMANCE

It is intended in this thesis to investigate the art of music in performance. Accordingly, the first question one might ask is: what exactly is meant by the phrase "music in performance"?

The usual response to such a question would indicate music in performance as music which is in the process of being "performed," i.e. being played on a musical instrument. The term performance, then, in so far as it occurs in this thesis, relates to music and indicates the actual playing of a musical composition on some sort of musical instrument.

Musical compositions, however, may be performed very well or very badly. Accordingly, when we speak of performance in this thesis, we are speaking of "ideal" performance, i.e. the kind of excellence of performance which every music composition ought ideally to receive. Having ascertained what we mean by the term performance, we must now ask: what is the function of performance within the overall art-form we call music? Performance is the completion of a musical work, the aspect which carries the musical creation (the composition), through from thought to physical expression. This immediately focuses attention on two essential aspects of performance: 1) performance, as an artistic activity, is very much concerned with physical expression, i.e. with live, actual sound; 2) because performance is concerned with real actual sound, we tend to think of the act of performance as a highly concentrated, experiential, present tense, "now"

type activity. 1) Performance as 'physical expression' is important for it helps to explain what distinguishes the musician-performer from the musician-composer and indirectly the relationship which nevertheless appears to exist between the two of them. What emerges here are two different yet complementary aspects of musical creativity. To the musician-composer, a musical work is capable of existing as something complete and self-evident before it achieves actual physical expression. In other words, the musical imagination of the composer tends to be conceptual rather than sonorous,¹ he tends to be more concerned with the creative manipulation of sounds in abstraction, i.e. imagined sounds, than with the creative manipulation of sounds as they occur as real, live acoustical phenomena. Thus, it was possible for Beethoven to continue composing even after deafness had occurred for, if he couldn't actually hear his musical compositions, he could, having heard music for so many years, at least imagine what they would sound like. It is extremely unlikely, on the other hand, that a deaf performer could continue to perform for his musical creative imagination is almost entirely sonorous, is concerned with musical sounds not so much in abstraction but as they occur in living reality. Thus, it is not at all sufficient for a performer to simply imagine sound, his art requires that he actually make sounds and it is his creative ability to work with real sound which determines his success or failure in the art of performance. Stated very generally then what

distinguishes performance creativity from compositional creativity is the propensity of the former to deal with sound as it occurs in living reality, and the propensity of the latter to deal more with sound as it exists in the imagination.

While this explains what distinguishes performance creativity from compositional, it does not explain the relationship which apparently exists between performer and the composer as represented within his musical composition. Here, a third, often forgotten, but in fact important element enters the picture -- the shared capacity of composers and performers to listen to musical sounds. Thus, if one asks, what makes a composer capable of imagining different sounds and relationships of sounds, the answer would have to state: the actual hearing of sounds first in reality. An aspect of "listening" creativity, then, lies implicit within every composer, and it is through experiencing real, physical sound that the composer develops his ability to imagine it. Often, in fact, composers come to know and understand the possibilities and complexities of physical sound through the medium of performance. Thus, a great number of our most well-known composers -- Bach, Mozart and Beethoven -- to name but a few, received a thorough training in the art of performance.

Now, a performer's creative imagination too is not totally confined to working with real actual sound. Rather, his playing of a musical composition requires that he

carries the musical composition through from the thought of the composer to physical sonorous expression. Obviously, then, the thought must be entirely grasped by the performer, if it is to be carried on, i.e. the performer must be capable of imaginatively grasping the abstract concepts of sounds set up by the composer and then of transforming them into actual, live, reality.² How does he acquire his ability to imaginatively grasp the abstract concepts of sound? Through the experience of real sound, i.e. through listening.

The two aspects of musical creativity, then, while different to a degree, nevertheless are founded on one common capacity which all musicians, be they listeners, performers or composers, share -- the capacity to experience musical sounds.


2) Because performance is concerned with real, actual sound, we tend to think of the act of performance as a highly concentrated, experiential, present-tense, "now"-type experience. Certainly, performers think of it in these terms and, moreover, are specifically trained to do so. Thus, performers are taught to try to play every performance as though it were the one and only opportunity given to them to play a particular composition. There is no question of a "second chance," no explaining to an audience that external circumstances prevent them from playing well tonight but that they will play well tomorrow night. Each performance demands total and complete concentration and commitment,

and part of the training of a performer, involves learning how to attain this despite the most adverse circumstances, i.e. how to attain the kind of concentration and commitment as will likely give rise to an "ideal" performance. The need or necessity to develop such concentration arises out of the nature of the activity, i.e. its concern with real actual sound. As has already been mentioned, the performer has to do more than just imagine sound, he has to make sound and it is the perceived link between imagination and actuality which calls for such intense concentration. In order to clarify this aspect, let us take a single musical note as an example. In Western culture, this note would probably be written down (notated) on a music score and would constitute the end product of the composer's idea or thought. It is at this point, however that the performer begins his creative work. For the performer the note sign functions as a kind of visual stimulus which is immediately re-directed into an auditory one, taking the form of an inwardly heard, i.e. imagined sound. This imagined sound in turn immediately sets up a muscular response whereby the muscles responsible for producing the sound (in the case of a pianist -- the hand) anticipate what movement they need to make in order to produce the imagined sound. At this point the sound is actually made, and now an evaluative process starts whereby the performer hears the sound and evaluates it. This takes the form of a comparison made between the imagined sound and the sound actually produced. Where the inwardly heard

tone and actually made tone match up the performer simply continues to the next note. Where they do not match up, two consequences may occur: 1) In a rehearsal situation, the performer would probably repeat the process in an attempt to effectively reproduce his inwardly heard sound. This, in fact, is the main purpose of practise -- teaching the muscles responsible for producing the sound to respond correctly to the imagined, inwardly heard tone. 2) In an actual performance situation where repetition is not possible a different reaction has to occur. Usually, a single note functions not alone but as part of an overall group of notes which together, (viewed as a whole) constitute a phrase or melodic outline. The performer, assuming that he has practised and knows the composition well, has an imaginative ideal which essentially tells him how the phrase ought to sound. This, as already explained, activates a muscular response but if the response is incorrect and an unanticipated (unexpected) sound emerges the performer does not simply ignore it and hope that the next sound will emerge more correctly; instead, in an "ideal" performance, his perception and evaluation of each actual (heard) tone automatically influences and subtly adjusts his imagination of the following tone which in turn influences and adjusts his muscular response and so the actual sound of the next tone; the process continues thus until the composition comes to an end.

The reason we have gone into this in such depth is

to explain the essential part which real sound has to play in the performer's art. In a very real sense, the very first note of a composition should determine how the rest of it will sound. The actual act of performance then, occurs as the result of a complex interaction and combination of real and imagined sound. In his very informative book The Art of Piano Playing,³ George Kochevitsky suggests that each sound occurs as a result of the following process:



The diagram is included here, for it effectively summarizes what we've been attempting to explicate in the preceding paragraphs. Needless to remark, the successful execution of this complex process for every note of the composition is an ideal towards which all performers aspire but rarely achieve in toto in the performance situation. However, the complicated nature of this process helps to explain the total concentration needed for performance; and the essential part played by "real" sound explains the present-tense

"now" quality which performers inevitably associate with the act of performance.

This initial investigation of the term performance has shown that the function of performance is to complete the act of musical creation -- to carry the thought of the composer through into live, actual sound and, that the element which primarily distinguishes the performer from the composer is the propensity of the former to work and deal with physical, live sound. Now, having achieved some general notion of what performance is about, we need to look more closely at the act of performance itself, i.e. we need to clearly establish what are the necessary and essential elements of performance art.

For the act of performance to occur, four elements must be present. There must be: 1) a music capable of being performed; 2) a performer who possesses; 3) the requisite amount of skill necessary to perform the music; and, 4) an audience or listener for whom the music is performed. Each of these must now be looked at in more detail.

1) The musical composition: this generally exists prior to the moment of performance, i.e. it has already been composed and is handed to the performer either notated on a musical score or in the case of most folk-musics, is handed down through aural tradition. All performance involves to a greater or lesser extent prior-existent music for even in jazz improvisation, the performers usually work out a basic if complex set of harmonic focal points around

which they build their free improvisatory material. The notion of a prior existent music, then, is not at issue here, however, the nature of that prior-existent music has a profound influence on the type or nature of the performance required. Generally speaking, the musical relationships embodied in a score or handed down in an aural tradition do not fix with rigid and inflexible precision what the performer's actualization of the score or aural tradition is to be.⁴ Instead, the prior-existent music reaches the performer through being embodied in a series of indications, more or less specific of what the composer intended and what tradition has established.

The amount of freedom available to the performer in his creative actualization of a score or aural tradition varies from culture to culture and within different periods of the same culture. Thus, in almost all non-Western music, in folk music and in jazz the performer is given much more freedom to add to and embellish the schematic guide given by the composer or handed down by aural tradition. Within Western style, the amount of freedom allowed varies from period to period: in some periods, e.g. the late nineteenth century, composers indicated in great detail exactly how they wished their music to be played and the performer is not supposed to add to or embellish with new patterns the notes set down by the composer; in other periods, e.g. the music of the seventeenth and eighteenth century, the performer was expected to make the music his own with much

less respect for the written text and much more reliance on spontaneous expression and improvisation than was permissible in the late nineteenth century.⁵ Even in the late nineteenth century, however, where the "detailing" of the score reached its most extreme stage, the performer does and is expected to play a creative role. The exact nature of this role we will examine more closely when we are dealing with the performer himself, the essential point to focus on here is the more, or less specific nature of the indications which the prior-existent (previously composed) music makes available to the performer.

Given that the prior-existent music reaches the performer in a series of indications which may be more or less specific, how does the performer go about interpreting these indications?, i.e. how does the composer set up or express his musical ideas in such a way that the performer can grasp them?

Unlike most romantic notions of the composer as "isolated genius," most, if not all composers are definite products of their particular social environments. It is within the confines of a particular social environment that any person first comes into contact with music and composers are no different from anyone else in that they acquire and internalize a particular kind of musical language or, more correctly, a musical style,⁶ long before they actually begin to compose. The initial, early compositions of most composers clearly reflect the musical style handed down to

them and innovation, be it radical or very slight occurs as a reaction to the older "traditional" style of composition. What is important to understand here is that musical compositions, even those which appear most radically individualistic, do not express the totally individualistic feelings and thoughts of composers. Rather, the composer expresses his ideas and emotions by means of musical compositions, i.e. through expressing his ideas in musical forms and idioms which to a large extent exist independently of his individual creative talents. Musical styles, in fact, are rarely if ever the product of a single individual, instead they come into being as artificial constructs developed and eventually understood by significant groups within specific cultures. In his interactions with given musical styles a composer may devise and propagate radical alternatives to accepted stylistic norms, but even here, his innovations tacitly accept the notion of "structured" sound patterns which is what all musical styles essentially consist of. Thus, while it is undoubtedly true that musical styles vary from culture to culture, from epoch to epoch within the same culture and even within a single epoch and culture, what is perhaps often not recognized is that there is one essential factor which all styles have in common -- their acceptance of the notion that sound can be structured.⁷

All musical styles exhibit syntactical procedures which organize sounds into system-relationships, e.g. scales and which impose limitations upon the combining of sounds,

i.e. establish harmonic conventions. While the differences between musical styles may be shown to reflect the different social environments or cultures in which they were developed, (for example, Javanese⁸ scales are entirely different from our Western European scales) their similarities, for example, the fact that they all endeavour to structure sound in some way or another, i.e. the fact that they both develop "scales" draw attention to an aspect of man which lies beyond the reach of cultural differentiation, man's propensity to organize and pattern his sense-perceived world, in this case, his world of sound. A composer, then, in creating musical works operates on at least three different levels; at the lowest most fundamental level compositions reflect his tendency as a "common" man to organize and structure sound; on the next level, as a social being his compositions will reflect albeit in a reactionary manner, the social, cultural environment of which he is inevitably a part; at a higher level again, his compositions will reflect his own individual ideas and aspirations which may conflict with the ideas and aspirations of his society but which have developed inevitably in interaction with them.

All musical compositions reflect and exhibit the three levels of musical creativity described above. At the most fundamental level compositions exhibit a patterning of sounds; at the next level, they exhibit the patternings of sound accepted and promoted by specific cultural groups; i.e. they exhibit aspects of a particular style at a higher

level again they exhibit the thoughts and aspirations of a specific composer. The final composition, created through a complex interaction of these three levels, usually reaches the performer in Western society by means of music notation.

As we have already seen, however, while music notation is a useful invention, it nevertheless often renders the actual intention of the composer extremely ambiguous. This is where the performer enters the picture. In the next section we have to ask: how does he manage, in the face of greater or less ambiguity to carry into completion the created musical work, i.e. how does he know what the composer intended?

2) The Performer: obviously, on the lowest most fundamental level, the performer too is a "common" man with the common man's propensity to create and respond to structured sound. This factor enables the performer at the very least to "get of gist" of music to which he may not be accustomed to respond, just as one can at times get the general idea of a play or poem heard in a foreign language that has some words in common with one's native tongue. Thus, Donington speaks of the performer's response to music as "fundamentally intuitive" suggesting that "our human faculty of intuition can have changed very little."⁹ In other words, performers at least share one fundamental characteristic with composers, they both tend to pattern sound.

However, "getting the gist" of a musical style is rather different from totally understanding the style, i.e. internalizing it to the point where one's responses are completely habitual, learned by constant practice in listening and performing, practice which should and usually does begin, in early childhood. Thus, a performer who constantly hears and is exposed to nineteenth century style will have already "built-in" as it were a basic knowledge as to how to interpret nineteenth century compositions. Such a performer will have little problem interpreting at least on a stylistic level, the works of nineteenth century composers. However, what of compositions of an earlier period, e.g. the seventeenth or eighteenth century or, indeed, works in the more modern styles of the twentieth century?

With regard to twentieth century works performers conceivably could, and often do consult with actual composers. Moreover, the techniques of recording make permanently available the actual physical sound-type conventions we accept as "normal" in the twentieth century. Such a situation, however, emphatically does not exist with regard to the earlier styles of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Here, all that reaches the performer are musical scores which as indications of what is supposed to be played are notoriously imprecise, and which in themselves give no indication of the sort of sound-quality the composer had in mind. How can the performer overcome this problem?

This is where scholarship enters the picture and the now well-established ideal of stylistic authenticity. Where formally, i.e. during the nineteenth century, performers displayed little or no qualms about interpreting all music compositions in nineteenth century style using the sonorous qualities peculiar to that century, now one hardly dares to play Bach on a grand piano for fear of incurring the wrath of the Baroque "purists."⁹ While one may agree with the notion of stylistic authenticity, it would appear nevertheless that one has to preserve some sort of balance here, for the fact remains that not only does style constitute but one aspect of musical creativity but also with regard to seventeenth and eighteenth century style we simply cannot know how the style actually was brought forward into physical expression, i.e. we cannot know what an eighteenth century interpretation of a Mozart sonata actually sounded like. Since we cannot actually hear a genuine eighteenth century performance, how can a performer of the twentieth century learn to interpret the style correctly? Donington suggests that in fact the only recourse is "to read about what the actual contemporaries of the music had to say about it,"¹⁰ but he is also quick to point out both the "common" aspects of musical creativity, e.g. "Modern ears are no more than ordinary ears in a modern setting ... our response to music is fundamentally intuitive ...";¹¹ and the intensely personal contribution which different performers have to offer when performing

any musical contribution, e.g. "there is no such thing as an exact [i.e. correct] interpretation ... It would be a much duller world if music would not tolerate more than one interpretation."¹²

What is needed in the area of stylistic interpretation, then, is balance. Performers must and should be allowed the freedom to illuminate different aspects of the music in accordance with whatever is individual in their response to it; but, only up to a certain point. Performers have absolutely no right to impose their individuality on that element of the music which is common to us all as members of Western society, they cannot and must not go outside the boundaries of the style. Thus, for example, a performer who insists on playing one of the smaller Mozart concertos with the kind of virtuosity one associates with more romantic concertos is indulging his own inclination towards virtuosity at the expense of the musical style. Or, as Donington so aptly indicates:¹³

Every piece of music carries implications with regard to performance which can be differently interpreted: but not beyond certain limits, because as soon as those limits are overstepped we feel a contradiction between the style of the music and the style of the interpretation.

In summary, performers must do all in their power to learn the different playing conventions relevant to the different styles. In a sense, the style is that aspect of a composition which sets the boundaries to their natural inclination to express their own, highly individualistic musical ideas. Moreover musical styles, because they

function independently of both individual composers and performers are the means whereby individual responses and ideas achieve real communication, i.e. listeners come to understand the composers and performers' ideas because they are expressed in stylistic conventions which make sense to them -- with which they are familiar. It is by means of musical styles that performers get their initial insights into the thoughts and intentions of composers. Under no circumstances can stylistic conventions ever be ignored.

While it is certainly true that much of the performer's art consists (or at least should consist) of painstaking attempts to grasp the essential ideas embodied in the composition, a large part of the performer's work consists in developing and ultimately articulating his own individual response to the music. What is the nature of this response? Most performers will speak of their initial response to a piece of music in emotional terms, or at least in terms which for them include a large measure of emotional response. Thus, student-performers speak of the "beauty" of a particular work in tones which immediately convey their emotional commitment to the composition in question. In fact, emotional commitment to the work, a passionate desire to actually play it or what Langer calls an element of "ardor for the import conveyed"¹⁴ appears to be an essential element of performance art for can anyone honestly remember a successful, "good" performance where the performer appeared to be unconcerned and nonchalant? One has only to

look at the phenomenon of the hard-rock concert to realise the contagious effect which an excited performer can have on an audience. Obviously, there is quite a difference between a rock-concert and a classical recital but they are similar in that both require enormous commitment on the part of the performer, what is different perhaps, is the manner in which this commitment is conveyed to the audience.

Thus, in classical recitals an excessive display of emotion is usually deplored because it tends to distract the audience, i.e. rather than listening to the music, they end up looking at the performer. However, a total absence of the appearance of emotional commitment tends to render the musical composition cold and lifeless, a mere succession of endless notes. How does a classical performer achieve a balance between these two extremes? I think, perhaps, Langer's notion of "ardor for the import conveyed" provides the key to understanding the nature of the balance required. All performers have an immense desire, even need to perform. One could justifiably suggest that they love the act of performing. In order to perform, however, one has to have something to perform -- in the case of a musical performer, a musical composition. How does this composition interact with the performer's instinct to perform?

In the case of the great artistic performers, e.g. Rubenstein or Schnabel, the love of performance is balanced with or perhaps even superceded by an immense respect and devotion to the art of music itself. Consequently, they

devote all their energy and talents towards making the music "work," and their individual response to the music is totally directed towards that end. In the case of many of the less artistic performers, on the other hand, e.g. Liberace, the musical composition is merely a vehicle for the expression of their own personal emotions and aspirations, i.e. the performer is more concerned with himself than with the musical composition. In the case of great artistic performance, then, it would appear that personal-individual response is somehow subsumed into a greater self-less response which prompts the performer to execute as meaningfully and expressively as he can the actual musical structures of the composition. There seems to be two factors intermingling here: one concerns the performer's individual, personal response; the other concerns some aspect of the music which seems to absorb that response. What is actually happening here?

The answer really lies in the often-cited ability of music to express emotion. Whether or not music truly possesses that ability is a debatable point but certainly music history indicates periods when it was generally believed, e.g. in the elaborate "Theory of Affects," not only that music expressed emotion but even specific emotions. What was the nature of the emotions expressed? Did they pertain to the emotions of the composer? Did they pertain to those of an eighteenth or nineteenth century audience? How would a present day,

twentieth century performer relate to them?

Donington suggests that, in fact, the emotional states expressed in music are "archetypal ... emotions common to our human condition ... so fundamental that they have always been with us."¹⁵ In other words emotional states which our ancestors experienced, which we experience today and which our descendants will experience in the future. Precisely because the emotions expressed in music are common to the human condition, nothing could feel more personal and private: it is "as though the music were our very own so closely identified do we become with it and so intimately are we absorbed into any deep hearing of it."¹⁶ This is exactly what happens in a good performance situation -- the music seems to be capable of expressing the performer's deepest emotional thoughts and so he throws himself, heart and soul as it were, into the act of playing. However, in a very real sense, the music is not exclusively the performer's own since anyone else capable of listening to the performance can commune with the music no less privately and no less personally, e.g. all the individual members of the audience. Thus, when performers seek to move beyond personal expression through a total concern or "ardor" for the expressive potential of the music, they are intuitively seeking to link up with some greater conception of man as a species-being, man as a "whole," Schiller's notion of "genus."¹⁷ In fact, it could well be argued that the joy and challenge of performance art consists in learning to

shed not one's individuality but something of its place-bound and time-bound limitations. Again, as Donington so aptly sums it all up:

there is a delight in responding to emotions older and bigger than our short life spans and more enduring, beginning as they did at the childhood of our race and stretching as we may hope into the illimitable future. Here are dreams, but dreams a great deal more solid and tough than our mere perishable mortality....¹⁸

To establish such a connection -- this is the dream and sometimes the reality of all performers.

Whether or not one accepts the somewhat heady idealism of the preceding paragraphs, it is not unreasonable to conclude that to a greater or lesser extent performers of eighteenth and nineteenth century works tend to respond emotionally to them. When does this response occur? It occurs during the performance, i.e. the performer's emotional response is an actual felt feeling. This relates to two points mentioned earlier: 1) just as the composer tends to deal with abstract sound-relationships so too, the emotions expressed in musical compositions reside in the music score as potential expressions of emotion, i.e. they too require completion; 2) just as the performer carries the abstract sound relationships forward into physical sound so, too, he completes the expression of emotion through totally identifying with and making his own of the potential emotions implicitly expressed in the music score, i.e. through actually responding to them during the performance. Will not this actually felt response interfere with or

distract him from concentrating on what he is doing? No, not if it is totally directed towards and responsive to the actual musical structures of the composition, i.e. he may feel as much as he wishes -- indeed he cannot feel enough -- so long as his personal feeling is concentrated on the musical content. Unfortunately, we are all too familiar with players who let their own needs for some emotional catharsis make the music simply their outlet and in so doing exhibit emotional gestures and reactions totally alien to the character and style of the music.

Thus, it is probably in reaction to this that performers are often encouraged to sit still and to exhibit no emotions facially or otherwise. All of this is understandable and perhaps even, in a general sense, useful but it totally undermines the essential function of performance which is to transform into physical-live actuality the expressive structures of musical compositions. This cannot be accomplished unless the performer actually feels and identifies with the expressive-emotive shapes of the composition. The admonition to be "cold-as-ice" is quite simply misdirected. It is not that performers must not feel, but rather that they must contain and direct their feeling towards the expressive content of the music. In so far as they do this, the music will take on a "nerve" and drive which will make it appear meaningful and alive. This, above all else is the function of performers.

To summarize: the performer in endeavouring to play a

music composition operates also on at least three levels: i) as a "common" man he perceives structure in musical sounds; ii) through experience and or scholarship he perceives the different structures which constitute different styles and seeks to understand how to translate them into physical sound; iii) on a more personal emotional level he responds to the music in a highly individualistic way but seeks to balance this individualized response with the more general response evoked by the musical style, and most important with what he perceives to be the composer's intentions.

3) Technical Skill: if the performer is to direct all of his responses towards the effective and successful transformation of the composition into physical sound, then, it follows, he must possess the sufficient amount of technical skill required to effect this transformation. Technique constitutes the means whereby the performer is enabled to play the composition, as such it cannot and must not be ignored. However, until comparatively recently, instrumental motor technique was considered as something separate from the art and personality of the performer, resulting in students spending long hours playing technical exercises which often seemed to have little or no connection with the more artistic aspects of playing. This is really a misconception of the term technique, for within the area of performance art, technique may include but in fact means much more than motor skill. In the broader artistic sense,

technique refers to the sum of all the means a performer has for realizing his purpose, his artistic musical idea. As such, it cannot be seen as something independent from the music and from the personality of a performer. As Kochevitsky, quoting Konstantin Igumnov indicates:¹⁹ "the tonal idea [inwardly heard tone] defines technique; from ear to movement, not vice versa"; and, since the "tonal idea" varies from player to player, in a very real sense there are as many different techniques as there are different tonal ideas. Thus, a performer's aesthetic beliefs as to how a musical composition ought to sound will largely determine the technique he will use to achieve that sound. Indeed, a really great performer does not so much have a technique, but rather many techniques. The musical ideas of each composer call forth very definite, individual tonal ideas. Hence, the technique of the good performer, his approach to tone production has to change, depending on whether he is playing Mozart or Bach, Beethoven or Debussy, the Bach Italian Concerto or the Bach Goldberg Variations. Perfection of technique, then, cannot be measured in terms of virtuoso-like motor skill but rather by the correspondence between artistic intentions and the means of their realization. Thus, if the musical content of a composition demands virtuoso-like playing, then, the performer must do his utmost to acquire it. On the other hand, should a composition demand a subtler, less obvious display of motor skill, it is entirely wrong for a player to superimpose on it his more virtuoso capabilities.

What of other motor-type reactions, e.g. facial expressions and greater body movements? In so far as these are made only in response to the music, they constitute a definite part of the broader sense of technique mentioned earlier and will facilitate the auditory perception of the audience. Thus, the sight of the player's meaningful responses to the music tends to reinforce the listener's own personal response. As mentioned earlier, however, where motor responses derived from sources other than the music occur, they tend to hinder not help the listener's personal response to the music and so rightly are to be avoided.

4) The audience or listener: listening is the primary musical activity, the most fundamental element in the whole art of music. The musician is exposed to the listening of music, long before he learns to write or play it. The composer imaginatively listens to his composition in progress; the performer listens to his tonal idea before he plays, and to the actual sound he makes; the audience or listener listens to the resultant completed musical composition.

The most important aspect of musical hearing is not, however, as so many people assume, the ability to distinguish the separate elements in a composition and to recognize formal devices, but rather, the ability to experience the musical structures, to respond to them in a meaningful manner. How does a listener learn to respond in such a manner? Meaningful musical hearing develops through exercise so that a listener no less than a performer or

composer, has to become totally familiar with aspects of musical styles, familiar to the point that he knows what to listen for. In other words, he has to know that a Chopinesque type beautiful melody with expressive accompaniment will not be apparent in the musical style of J.S. Bach and adjust his listening expectations accordingly. What happens in the case of new music which the listener has never heard before?

Here, the performer acts as bridge or easy pathway to the new style. He has seen the music before and presumably has made himself familiar with and responsive to the new stylistic conventions. The performer, however, is in a very fundamental sense a "common" man, and his responses to the music arise out of musical perceptions which given time, the listener too would probably arrive at. In a certain sense, then, the listener's response is activated in two ways: he both hears the music and simultaneously observes the responsive behaviour of the performer which reinforces or gives emphasis to his own direct response to the music. In the case of totally "new" music, the player's committed response may serve to correctly initiate a new mode of listening response on the part of a listener. Thus, one of the essential functions of a performer is to make easier the musical responses of their listeners. As Stravinsky observed: "The sight of the gesture and movements of the various parts of the body producing the music is fundamentally necessary if it is to be grasped in all its fullness."²⁰

A good performer above all else wants to make the music work, this involves a meaningful recognition of the listener as "fellow-musician," it involves wanting to share one's musical responses. Performers perhaps should look carefully at how this sharing might be achieved today. It is possible that the nineteenth century concept of concert/recitals no longer makes it feasible.

In the preceding paragraphs, we have attempted to develop some insights into the essential characteristics of performance art. Our intention was to deal with performance as seen through the eyes of the "average" performer. However, for the remainder of this chapter, we will include a number of very important quotations which directly relate to performance art. These derive from eighteenth and nineteenth century "authorities" on performance and from certain eye-witnesses who attempted, fortunately for us, to write down what they saw. In including these quotations, the intention is: 1) to add an eighteenth/nineteenth century perspective on the art of music performance, a perspective still prevalent today; 2) to offer support for many of the notions put forward in this chapter.

Quotations as to the Nature of Music in Performance

In the preceding sections, we dealt at some length with the capacity of music to express emotion and the necessary ability of the performer to grasp and relate to that emotion. In relation to this: F.W. Marburg in "Des critischen

Musicus an der spree erster Band," Berlin: 2, Sept. 1749
writes:

All musical expression has an affect or emotion for its foundation. A philosopher when expounding or demonstrating will try to enlighten our understanding to bring it lucidity and order. The orator, the poet and the musician attempt rather to enflame than to enlighten
... to interpret rightly every composition which is put in front of him a musician needs the utmost sensibility and the most felicitous powers of intuition.²¹

The possibility of musical expression having an affect or emotion for its foundation is more explicitly stated in our next quotation. Mozart, however, is careful to point out the limitations which the art form, music itself, imposes on emotional expression. W.A. Mozart, Letter to his father, 26th Sept., 1781 (trans. E. Anderson, London: 1938):

For just as a man in such a towering rage
[as Osmin in Die Entführung aus dem Serail]
oversteps all the bounds of order, moderation and propriety and completely forgets himself, so must the music, too forget itself. But, as passions, whether violent or not must never be expressed in such a way as to excite disgust, so music, even in the most terrible situations must never offend the ear, but must please the hearer.²²

That it is the duty of performers to grasp intuitively or otherwise the emotional intention or intentions of the composer is readily apparent in the following quotations. As such, they provide an important insight into the eighteenth/nineteenth century concept of the relationship between performer and composer Joachim Quantz, Versuch einer Anweisung die Flöte traversiere zu spielen, Berlin, 1752:

The performer of a piece ought to seek out and arouse in himself not only the main feeling but others which occur. And since in most pieces there is a perceptual interchange of feelings, the performer should know which is the feeling in each idea and govern his expression accordingly.²³

And since instrumental music has, without words to express different passions and to carry the hearer from one to another, as well as vocal music, we can readily see that to do that, and supply it in the absence of word or human voice the composer and he who performs the music must alike have a feeling soul and one capable of being moved.²⁴

On the importance of the performer's role, Quantz writes:

The good effect of the music depends almost as much on the performers as on the composers.²⁵

C.P.E. Bach in his Versuch uber die wahre Art das Clavier zu spielen Berlin 1753 (Trans. and ed. W.J. Mitchell, New York, 1949) having spoken of the performer's emotional response, suggests:

Above all he must discharge this office in a piece which is highly expressive by nature, whether it be by him or someone else. In the latter case he must make certain that he assumes the emotion which the composer intended in writing it....²⁶

As may be seen from the preceding quotations, an emotional response to musical compositions on the part of the performer was not alone acceptable but even essential in the eighteenth/nineteenth century concept of performance. Now, we must ask, (bearing the "cold as ice" notion of performance in mind), when does this response occur? C.P.E. Bach in Versuch uber die wahre Art states emphatically:

A musician cannot move others unless he too is moved. He must of necessity feel all of the affects that he hopes to arouse in his audience for the revealing of his own humour will stimulate a like humour in the listener. In languishing sad passages the performer must languish and grow sad. [Here, however, the error of a sluggish, dragging performance must be avoided caused by an excess of affect and melancholy ... footnote added in 1787 ed.] Similarly, in lively joyous passages, the executant must again put himself into the appropriate mood. And so, constantly varying the passions, he will barely quiet one before he arouses another.²⁷

In the same vein W.A. Mozart in another letter to his father (Jan. 17th, 1778) writes:

[having described the playing of one "Herr Vogler"]
... the listener (I mean those of them who are worthy to be so named) can only claim to have "seen" music and clavier playing. They hear, think and "feel" as little during the performance, as the player himself.²⁸

As may be seen from the above remarks both C.P.E. Bach and Mozart suggest that a performer's emotional response occur during the performance, i.e. that it be an actual feeling. It is worth noting too that they both implicitly cite this response as a necessary element in the desired emotional response of the musical listener.

In connection with the evocation of the listener's response, a clear concept of the use and importance of gesture emerges. Thus, C.P.E. Bach in the Versuch uber die wahre Art writes:

It is principally in improvisations or fantasias that the keyboardist can best master the feelings of his audience. Those who maintain that all of this can be accomplished without gesture will retract their words when, owing to

their own insensibility, they find themselves obliged to sit like a statue before their instrument. Ugly grimaces are of course inappropriate and harmful; but fitting expressions help the listener to understand our meaning.²⁹

Did C.P.E. Bach actually display emotional responses while playing? Dr. Charles Burney in his Present State of Music in Germany, the Netherlands and the United Provinces, 2 vols. London, 1773 states:

[that C.P.E. Bach at the clavichord]
... grew so animated and possessed that he not only played but looked like one inspired. His eyes were fixed, his underlip fell and drops of effervescence distilled from his countenance. He said if he were to set to work frequently, in this manner, he should grow young again.³⁰

F.W. Marburg in "Des Critischen Musicus" writes

I know a great composer [Bach?] on whose face one can see depicted everything that his music expresses as he plays it at the keyboard.³¹

In a very real sense, then, body gestures and movements were incorporated into the expressive technique of the performer. Indeed, the separation of one from the other was even deplored as Francois Couperin in his "L'Art de Toucher le Clavecin" (Paris, 1717) indicates:

Experience has taught me that powerful hands capable of performing whatever is most rapid and light are not always those which show to best advantage in tender and expressive pieces, and I declare in all good faith that I am more pleased with what moves me than with what astonishes me.³²

Earlier, we spoke of the different levels of response required of the performer, including a common emotional response, a specific stylistic response and a more unique,

individual response. Anton Schindler in his Biographie von Ludwig van Beethoven (Munster, 1871), on the second movement of the Pathetique speaks of the problems of notation and the necessary interaction of common and stylistic emotional responses:

The warm emotion of the performer will enable him to restore the missing markings to their correct place without difficulty Emotion alone is not to be trusted, [however] ... only cultivated artistic taste will choose the correct³³

Noting the individual characteristics of any performer, Quantz in Versuch einer Anweisung die Flöte suggests:

Almost every musician has a different expression from that of others. It is not always the different teaching that they have received which causes this variety, the difference of temprement and character also contribute.³⁴

Finally, it was asserted at the end of the previous section that it was the duty of the performer to facilitate and render more directly meaningful, the direct response of the musical listener. C.P.E. Bach, in Versuch uber die wahre Art refers directly to this duty when he states:

It can be seen from the many affects which music portrays that the accomplished musician must have special endowments and be capable of employing them wisely. He must carefully appraise his audience, their attitude towards the expressive content of his programme, the place itself and other additional factors. Nature has wisely provided music with every kind of appeal so that all might share in its enjoyment. It thus becomes the duty of the performer to satisfy to the best of his ability, every last kind of listener.³⁵

One final remark: earlier we referred to the contagious excitement which an excited performer can evoke in his audience. As an example we mentioned the phenomenon of the "hard-rock" concert. One of the problems with classical musician-performers is the way they allow the performance tradition to stifle their natural enthusiasm. How many classical recitals are stiff and uninteresting because the natural, excited performance instinct is not apparent. We might do well to examine this final quotation and perhaps realise that the hard-rock concert has retained an element which we have perhaps lost. J. Mainwaring, Memoirs of the Life of George Frederick Handel, London 1760:

On Handel's playing ... "the audience was so enchanted with this performance that a stranger who should have seen the manner in which they were affected would have imagined they had all been distracted."³⁶

Here, however, it must be remembered, that music history provides many examples of situations where a time-lag of sorts may be seen to exist between composers, performers and listeners. Thus, in the music of our own century, many composers have created musical works which lie beyond the musical comprehension of many present-day performers, who are quite content to limit themselves to the playing of older, well established, traditional repertoire. As a result, listeners are not exposed, in a meaningful way, to the music of the twentieth century, which leads them often to conclude that they neither like nor understand it. This results in a "chicken and egg" situation where

listeners, not liking twentieth century music, tend not to frequent recitals involving it, thus creating little "demand" for its performance; because there is such a low demand for its performance, performers, in turn, tend to concentrate on more well-known sought after repertoire; and, so, the oft cited chasm³⁷ which exists today between composer and listener becomes ever wider as composers, performers, and listeners all move in different stylistic circles.

Footnotes

¹ Susanne, K. Langer, Feeling and Form (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd., 1953), p. 141.

² Ibid., p. 138.

³ George Kochevitsky, The Art of Piano Playing: a scientific approach (Illinois: Sammy Birchard Co., 1967), p. 31.

⁴ Leonard B. Meyer, Emotion and Meaning in Music (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956), p. 199.

⁵ Robert Donington, The Interpretation of Early Music (London: 1963. Revised version, 1974. Unwin Brothers Ltd. The Gresham Press, Old Working, Surrey).

⁶ "Musical styles are more or less complex systems of sound relationships understood and used in common by a group of individuals." Leonard B. Meyer, Emotion and Meaning, op. cit., p. 45.

⁷ Meyer, Emotion and Meaning, op. cit., p. 63.

⁸ See Ibid., p. 215.

⁹ Donington, Early Music, op. cit., p. 88.

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 88.

¹¹ Ibid., p. 88.

¹² Ibid., p. 89.

¹³ Ibid., p. 89.

¹⁴ Langer, Feeling and Form, op. cit., p. 141.

¹⁵ Donington, Early Music, op. cit., p. 50.

¹⁶ Ibid., p. 50.

¹⁷ Friedrich Schiller, "On the Aesthetic Education of Man in a Series of Letters" 1795 in A Modern Book of Aesthetics, ed. Melvin Rader, pp. 466-472.

¹⁸ Donington, Early Music, op. cit., p. 50.

¹⁹ kochevitsky, Piano Playing, op. cit., p. 37.

²⁰Igor Stravinsky, Chronicle of my Life (London: Victor Gollancz Ltd., 1936), p. 122.

²¹F.W. Marburg, "Des Critischen Musicus an der Spree erster Band" Berlin, 1750 quoted in Donington, Early Music, op. cit., p. 113.

²²W.A. Mozart, Letter to his father, Sept. 26 1781 trans. E. Anderson (London: 1938).

²³Joachim Quantz, Versuch einer Anweisung die Flöte traversiere zu spielen Berlin, 1752. Trans. and ed. F.R. Reilly as On Playing the Flute (London: 1966).

²⁴Ibid.

²⁵Ibid.

²⁶C.P.E. Bach, Versuch uber die wahre Art das Clavier zu spielen Berlin, 1753. Trans. and ed. W.J. Mitchell as An Essay on the True Art of Playing Keyboard Instruments (New York: W.W. Norton and Co. Inc., 1949).

²⁷Ibid.

²⁸W.A. Mozart, "Letter to his father" Jan. 17th 1778 in Letters of Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart selected and edited by Hans Mersmann, Trans. M.M. Bozman (London: J.M. Dent, 1928).

²⁹C.P.E. Bach, Versuch uber die wahre Art, op. cit.

³⁰Charles Burney, Present State of Music in Germany, the Netherlands and the United Provinces, 2 vols., London: 1773. ed. Percy A. Scholes as Dr. Burney's Musical Tours in Europe, 2 vols. (London: 1959).

³¹F.W. Marburg, "Des Critischen Musicus," op. cit.

³²Francois Couperin, L'Art de Toucher le Clavecin, Paris, 1717. Ed. and Ger. trans. A. Linde, with Eng. Trans. M. Roberts (Leipzig: 1933).

³³Anton Schindler, Biographie von Ludwig van Beethoven, Munster: 1871 quoted in Readings in the History of Music in Performance. Selected, trans. and ed. Carol MacClintock (London: Indiana University Press, 1979).

³⁴Quantz, Versuch einer Anweisung die Flöte, op. cit.

³⁵C.P.E. Bach, Versuch uber die wahre Art, op. cit.

³⁶J. Mainwaring, Memoirs of the Life of the Late George Frederick Handel (London: 1760).

³⁷ Henry Reynor, Music and Society Since 1815
(New York: Taplinger Publishing Co., Inc., 1978).

II. THE THEORY OF EINFUHLUNG

Having investigated the average performer's notion of "performance", we must now turn our attention towards that theory of aesthetic experience, which, it is hypothesized, has particular relevance for performance art. Accordingly, in this chapter, we must investigate "Einfuhlung," seeking to understand clearly its essential idea and, in more exact detail, the concepts which together constitute that idea. Here, it must be borne in mind, that the primary purpose of this investigation is to see what insight the theory of Einfuhlung can offer into performance art. Accordingly, while the succeeding analysis will address the spectator or "experiencer" of art, it is our contention that it offers also valuable insight into performance.

The aesthetic theory of "Einfuhlung" was developed towards the turn of the century primarily in Germany but also in England where the term "Empathy" was coined as an English rendering of the original German term. There are three main proponents of "Einfuhlung/Empathy": T. Lipps,¹ whose Raumaesthetik contained the first detailed exposition of the theory, published his account in 1893-1897; J. Vokelt,² whose System der Asthetik was published round about the same time; and Vernon Lee,³ the original proponent of "Empathy" writing in English, whose account appeared in an article "Beauty and Ugliness" in the

Contemporary Review in 1897. Also considered in this chapter are the writings of R. Vischer.⁴

In dealing with art "Einfuhlung" focuses primarily on people's experience of art which, it posits, always has two essential elements: 1) a work of art; and, 2) a spectator. It is the 'dynamic interaction' of these two essential elements which gives rise to what the proponents of Einfuhlung would term the "aesthetic" experience.

The first question one must ask then in relation to this theory of the aesthetic experience is: what is meant by the term Einfuhlung or Empathy?

Einfuhlung is literally translated as "feeling into."⁵ Thus, to place this within the context of the interaction which takes place between work of art and spectator, the spectator as it were, "feels his way into the work of art." It is in connection with this rather vague notion of "feeling into" that one must read the three actual definitions of Einfuhlung I include below. In these, Einfuhlung is defined as:

- (1) "the act whereby we bestow on things our own soul and its moods."⁶ R. Vischer.
- (2) "the perception of mental life in animate or inanimate things."⁷ T. Lipps.
- (3) "the attribution of our own modes of dynamic experience to shapes."⁸ Vernon Lee.

What meaning or explication of Einfuhlung emerges from these definitions?

All three definitions may be broken down into three key components: (1) things or shapes exist; (2) upon which we, i.e. the spectator, bestow, in which we perceive or to which we attribute; (3) our own mental lives including our feelings and aspirations, i.e. the soul and its moods, our own modes of dynamic experience."

Examining the first component mentioned above, it may be observed that no specific mention is made of works of art. Instead, Vischer, Lipps and Lee indicate that in *Einfühlung* we "feel our way into" things or shapes. So, one must ask what do they mean by 'things or shapes'? May works of art qualify as viable examples of such things or shapes? Are there shapes or things other than works of art which may also promote the act of *Einfühlung*?

As will become apparent later in this chapter, all the proponents of *Einfühlung* regard works of art as examples "par excellence" of the sort of shape or thing which will promote an act of *Einfühlung*. However, this is not to suggest that *Einfühlung* only occurs in connection with works of art. It can and does occur in connection with things other than art objects. So, for example, one may look at a natural object such as a tree and perceive its shape as somehow expressive of a particular emotional state; in *Einfühlung*'s terms, one may bestow upon the shape of that tree one of one's own moods, e.g. the bleakness of despair upon the bare skeleton-like shapes of trees in winter. Indeed the bestowal of personal emotion unto aspects of

nature is exactly what Schubert describes in his song cycle "Die Winterreise." Now, the bestowal of personal emotions onto natural objects such as trees is no less an act of *Einfuhlung* than that which occurs in connection with art works and the fact that Vischer, Lipps and Lee all refer to "things or shapes" rather than works of art is an implicit affirmation of this notion. In arguing thus, they adhere to that well argued notion of the aesthetic experience which states that while aesthetic experiences are typically caused by works of art such as plays, paintings and the like, they may also be caused by other things such as sunsets, beautiful landscapes, football games and so on.⁹

In the case of art works, an act of *Einfuhlung* occurs when one looks at a painting, or listens to a musical composition and sees or hears it as somehow expressive of one's own emotional feelings and aspirations, i.e. when one bestows upon it or, in Vischer's later terms "projects into it"¹⁰ one's own mental/emotional life. Relating this to performance art, an act of *Einfuhlung* occurs when the performer, in working with a musical composition, sees or hears it as somehow expressive of his own emotional feelings and aspirations; i.e. when he bestows upon it or projects into it his own mental emotional life.

Examining components 2) and 3) while the projection of personal emotions and feeling into the object of perception, is an essential aspect of the theory of *Einfuhlung*, it by no means represents the entire picture,

as the definitions above might seem to suggest. *Einfuhlung* is distinctly not a process in which the object of perception, be it a natural object or work of art could be seen as largely irrelevant -- a sort of *tabula rasa* upon which "our soul and its moods" or, "our own modes of dynamic experience" can freely play. Instead, as we shall see, *Einfuhlung* insists that the actual object of perception, in the case of art -- the work of art, has a vitally important, no less essential part to play in the "aesthetic" experience. Why then, in the definitions does the primary emphasis seem to focus on the role of the spectator?

I think there is an important distinction to be made here between a thing or shape as object of perception, i.e. as perceived by someone and that same shape or thing as "datum"¹¹ (White head), existing independent of perception in the external world. In other words, there is an important distinction to be made between that thing which simply exists as a canvas with blobs of paint on it, and that same thing seen and interpreted as a "painting"; in the same way, there is an important distinction to be made between those marks on a page which in themselves, i.e. without anyone attending to them, are simply dead entities, and those same marks interpreted and understood, i.e. "read," as the words of a poem. Now, when the proponents of *Einfuhlung* insist that a work of art plays a very important, no less essential part in the aesthetic experience, they are referring to the work of art not as datum but rather to the

perceived art work, the work as object of perception.¹² As an object of perception, what on one level exists as blobs of paint on the canvas, or, indeed the marks (notes) on the musical score, on a second "perceived" level appear to undergo a rather dramatic change: here, the mind via our eye or ear selects and groups what it sees or hears; it classifies and analyzes; attends to some features rather than others; distinguishes the essential from the non essential, the intrinsic from the incidental -- it orders and patterns the blobs of paint, the marks on the music score into relationships of some sort or another and in so doing perceives a form or structure.¹³

It is this perceived form or structure which evokes the emotional response described in the definitions and which has a no less essential part to play in the aesthetic experience, and, as this depends upon perception, in a certain sense the definitions are correct in ascribing the more essential role to the spectator.

On the other hand, the order or structure discerned in the art work or natural object is neither arbitrary or fictitious. The pattern or form perceived is derived from existent objects which are really there in the world. The blobs of paint really do exist, they are not arbitrary figments of subjective imagination. Through perception individuals may interpret what simply exists but they have to have something to interpret, they do not work in a vacuum. In not clarifying this important point, the

proponents of Einfuhlung, at least as far as their definitions are concerned, allow their theory to appear more subjective than it in fact really is. Indeed, the theory of Einfuhlung, more closely examined, reveals itself as neither wholly subjective nor wholly objective, rather as an interesting attempt to bridge the gap between the totally subjective and the totally objective. Accordingly, we must now ask: how does the theory of Einfuhlung integrate the subjective and objective?

On the subjective side: Einfuhlung ascribes a very important role in the aesthetic experience to the perceiving subject. It is his interaction with the natural object or art work which gives rise to the aesthetic experience, and it is as a result of this interaction that what Lipps terms the "aesthetic object" springs into existence. What does he mean by the term "aesthetic object" and how may it be distinguished from the term work of art?

One of the problems here is that Lipps appears to use both terms interchangeably, a usage which is uncommon since "work of art" and "aesthetic object" are not normally taken to mean the same thing. Accordingly, let us first ask what is meant by the term "aesthetic object"?

The "aesthetic object," Lipps maintains, consists of the "sensuous appearance," not the bare physical "datum," but rather that "image" transformed and remodeled by the subjective imagination and charged with vital meaning,¹⁴ i.e. given emotional significance. In other words, the

"aesthetic object" is the "felt into" object of perception -- the object already seen as permeated with subjective emotion. What is meant by the term work of art? Here, it might be possible to introduce the distinction that "work of art" refers not to the bare physical "datum," nor yet to the "felt-into" object of perception but rather to the datum as perceived structural object, i.e. the painting perceived as such but not yet "felt into" in the manner or *Einfühlung*. But, if such a distinction is possible why does Lipps use the two terms interchangeably?

Here, we have to look carefully again at the proposed projection of emotion into art works. According to *Einfühlung* theory, the shape or form of things once perceived is always and inevitably seen as expressive of human personality. In other words, the transference of personal emotion from the perceiving subject into the perceived object occurs so quickly and spontaneously that when we see the object it seems already infused or permeated with our own subjective feeling.¹⁵ Thus, it is not the case that we first perceive an object, i.e. a canvas with blobs of paint on it, which we interpret as a painting, and then, only after this has occurred, project into it our feelings and aspirations. Rather, the very act of perceiving the painting is accompanied by a spontaneous and immediate act of projection which causes us to perceive the art work as an "aesthetic object" -- as permeated with subjective mental life. Because perception and the act of

emotional projection are so spontaneously, immediately, and inevitably connected, one cannot look at a work of art without seeing an "aesthetic object"; i.e. it is impossible to experience an art work in a totally objective manner; always and inevitably subjective elements (emotions) are involved.

This spontaneity and immediacy of the act of emotional projection, which constitute for both Lipps and Vorelt one of the unique and special characteristics of *Einfühlung*, so highlights two important considerations: 1) it explains why Lipps uses "work of art" and "aesthetic object" interchangeably, for if the very act of perception inevitably and immediately involves an act of *Einfühlung* to occur, then the "work of art" is always and inevitably seen as an "aesthetic object," hence, the two terms may be used interchangeably; 2) because subjective elements are always and inevitably involved, attempts to evaluate art objects in terms of formal structure only without reference to the emotional responses which they generate can at best produce only a partial explanation of what gives rise to the aesthetic experience. Hence, pure formalism is a complete illusion.

On the other hand, to focus on the objective side: it is the perceived shape or form of the object which evokes the emotional response. As mentioned earlier, this perceived structure derives from objects which really exist out there in the world. Thus, attempts to evaluate works

of art in terms of purely personal responses, without reference to the structural features which evoke them are no more valid than the totally objective theories posited by the formalists.

For the act of *Einfuhlung* to occur then, there must be a perceiving subject and a perceived object -- work of art.

How may the foregoing treatment of subject and object be related to the art of performance? Here, the performer functions as the perceiving spectator whose encounter with the art object, i.e. the musical composition, inevitably causes him to view it as somehow expressive of his own subjective mental life. In other words, the very act of hearing the composition causes him to spontaneously and immediately project into it his own subjective feelings and aspirations. Let us focus here on what Lipps and Vokelt regard as the inevitable connection between hearing the composition and experiencing an act of *Einfuhlung*. In a recital situation, a performer hears, i.e. listens to what he is playing. But, if Lipps and Vorelt are correct and the very act of hearing causes an act of *Einfuhlung* to occur, then inevitably he will respond to the musical composition during the recital, i.e. he will respond while he is playing. This highlights two important points about performance, both of which were mentioned in chapter one: 1) it is entirely possible, even inevitable, that a performer will emotionally respond to the music during performance. Thus,

the admonition to be "cold as ice" is totally inappropriate as C.P.E. Bach's words so aptly demonstrate.¹⁶ 2) Because an act of Einfuhlung occurs during the actual performance, performers tend to view their art as a highly-concentrated, present-tense, "now"-type activity.¹⁷ It is not the case that they go out on stage and seek to reproduce the response to the musical composition that they achieved yesterday; rather they seek to re-experience that response "now" -- a process easier said than done!

On the objective side: it is the musical composition which must evoke the emotional response. Thus, performance does not involve a totally subjective projection of emotion on the performer's part. Rather, the nature of his response must be both evoked and contained by the nature of the musical structures of the composition.

This focus on the more objective aspects of the aesthetic experience brings to light another unique and special characteristic of Einfuhlung -- its relative selflessness. Einfuhlung springs into existence only on contemplation of an external object. It therefore derives from the object contemplated and must be distinguished from the act of contemplation itself. Here, attention is not directed towards the self; it is directed towards the object and absorbed therein.¹⁸ Nevertheless, what gives emotional meaning and significance to the object is the act of contemplation. In contemplating the art work, my mind unconsciously enlivens the outward form by fusing into it

the modes of its own emotional activities -- its striving and willing, its hopes and aspirations and so forth. But, the emotional feelings and aspirations thus transported into the object do not arise out of purely personal needs and considerations, they both derive from and are concentrated entirely within an independent external object and so, in that sense are freed from personal interests.

Here again, we find a parallel situation in performance art. Performance tradition demands that we direct all our energy and talents towards making the music work; and as mentioned in chapter one,¹⁹ that our individual response to the music be totally directed towards that end. In other words, attention is not directed towards the self -- the performer's own subjective feelings and aspirations; rather, it is directed towards the object -- the musical composition and absorbed as it was therein. Nevertheless it is this act of attention on the performer's part which gives emotional meaning and significance to the musical composition. In attending, i.e. listening to, concentrating on the musical composition, the performer unconsciously enlivens the musical structures by fusing into it the modes of his own emotional activities. But, the emotional activities thus transported into the musical composition do not arise out of personal needs and considerations, they both derive from and are concentrated entirely within an independent, external object -- the musical composition and so in that sense are freed from personal interests.

This relative selflessness of *Einfuhlung* points up the need for a closer look at the spontaneity of the act of projection. Spontaneity here could be interpreted in at least two ways:²⁰ 1) as a totally uninhibited emotional engagement with the art work with the implications of no deliberation, restraint or discipline which this carries; 2) as an unforced emotional response which might yet be the product of an exacting mental discipline. Which interpretation would rightly apply in the theory of *Einfuhlung*? Unfortunately, neither Lipps, Volkelt or Lee address themselves to an explication of what they mean by spontaneity. However, given their insistence that the art work itself has an essential part to play in the aesthetic experience, one could reasonably present the second interpretation as the more suitable explication of spontaneity in *Einfuhlung*. The notion of a totally uninhibited emotional engagement with no deliberation or restraint would inevitably undermine and possibly even eradicate the very real restraints which the actual art work imposes on the projection of emotions. Moreover, the ability to perceive structure and form in art works, while intuitive to a degree, may also be described as a learned response achieved through practise, and requiring a certain amount of skill and knowledge. Thus, for example, in sporting events, the players have to "know" (i.e. have to have learnt) the rules of the game. Within the parameters of those rules, however, their reactions are still

spontaneous.²¹ The effort and self-discipline needed to attain that skill and knowledge is at least hinted at in the second interpretation of spontaneity. For that reason, it seems reasonable to select it as the more appropriate explication of the term as it is used in Einführung theory.

This interpretation of spontaneity, moreover, illuminates an essential aspect of performance art -- the preparation or "practice" which always takes place before any recital situation. For performers, the word "practice" covers a multitude: in a technical sense it involves, as was mentioned in chapter one,²² teaching the muscles responsible for producing the sound to respond correctly to the inwardly-heard (imagined) tone. That imagined tone, however, is itself a product of many factors: e.g. the most intuitive, basic musical apprehension;²³ knowledge and understanding of the style of the composition;²⁴ the performer's individual response to the work in question;²⁵ the depth of his performance experience; these and many other factors are all brought to bear on the actual recital situation so that an act of Einführung experienced during the actual recital while an unforced emotional response, nevertheless occurs partly as the end-product of the exacting practise procedures which preceded it. Here, we see illustrated, that delicate balance of spontaneity and control which is one of the hallmarks of performance art. Performers practise in order to gain control, yet every performer speaks of the necessity of "letting go" during

the actual recital situation. The interpretation of spontaneity chosen above, nicely illustrates this delicate balance.

Given that the proponents of Einfühlung theory suggest that a transference of emotion from the subject into the object occurs, what explanation do they offer for this important occurrence?

Because of the immediacy of the act of projection, both Lipps and Vokelt rule out the possibility of explaining Einfühlung either as a type of association or alternately as mere recollection. Rather, it is posited as a much deeper process occurring in the subconscious regions of the mind.²⁶ When the act of projection occurs, i.e. when the inner emotional activities of the subject are fused with the external sensuous form of the object, the mind unconsciously supposes itself at one with the object and there is no longer any duality. In other words the distinction between self and object is destroyed and the subjective observer as it were "lives" the object. Einfühlung then, means "the disappearance of the twofold consciousness of self and object, and the enrichment of experience that results from this interpretation."²⁷

Vernon Lee, at this point parts company with Lipps and Vokelt, objecting to their conception of Empathy as a "metaphysical and quasi-mythological projection of the ego into the object or shape under consideration." Unfortunately, her proposition that Empathy exists throughout our mental

life as a "simple though far from elementary psychological process"²⁸ ... doesn't really help to clarify matters.

This is a crucial, but very problematical aspect of the *Einfuhlung* theory. In order to try to explain what is involved here, let us consider a specific, yet very common example of a transference of emotion from subject into object: let us consider someone's perception that a particular musical composition expresses "sadness". How might association or recollection explain such a transference?

Examining the notion of association first: within the confines of Western European musical style, the minor key has, over a period of many years, come to be associated with "sadness". Thus, it is entirely possible that on hearing a musical composition written in a minor key, one could unconsciously associate the minor key with sadness and so, almost automatically perceive the composition as "sad".

Or, examining the notion of recollection: a musical composition -- let us say Schubert's song-cycle "*Die Schone Mullerin*" -- might evoke in us personal memories of a "sad" experience similar to that described by Schubert in his musical work. Because of this, it is entirely possible that on hearing the musical composition, we might unconsciously transfer the feelings we experienced in our own personal situation onto the musical composition and so perceive the music as expressing those feelings.

Now, Lipps and Vokelt insist that the act of *Einfuhlung*

cannot be explained in terms of either notion. Accordingly, one must ask: How does the transference of emotion brought about by an act of *Einfuhlung* differ from those mentioned above?

Unfortunately, Lipps and Vokelt are somewhat vague about the nature of the distinction, however, they do offer some clues as to how it might be explained. For example, they state that because of the "immediacy" of the act of projection, *Einfuhlung* cannot be explained in terms of association or recollection. This would seem to imply that the transference of emotion brought about by association or recollection is less immediate than that caused by *Einfuhlung*. Also, in the transference of emotion brought about by *Einfuhlung*, the distinction between self and object is destroyed and one, as it were "lives" the object.

Let us look at the notion of immediacy first. In association or recollection, as it normally occurs, something serves to remind us of something else. Thus, as a product of a Catholic upbringing, I "associate" eating fish with Fridays; i.e. eating fish tends to remind me of Fridays, or bring "Fridays" to mind. While the association between one thing and another may be so fast as to appear immediate, generally speaking, the temporal sequence follows the pattern of object and then association: fish -- Friday. In the experience of *Einfuhlung*, however, according to Lipps and Vokelt, the projection of emotion into the object is totally immediate; i.e. it is not that the object reminds

us of something else; rather, it "is," or appears to be totally infused with that something else. Thus, it is not that the music reminds us of a particular emotion, or brings it to mind; rather it appears to be totally infused with that emotion to the extent that we completely cease to regard ourselves as subjects listening to an object-musical composition. Instead, we enter into a kind of different realm created by the 'dynamic interaction' of both listener and composition where subjects and objects do not exist. For example, spectators of sporting events such as football games, can get so involved in the game that they actually feel part of it, in some important way. In the same way we become or "live" Schubert's unhappy Miller; we become or "live" the sadness or whatever emotion we perceived as expressed in the music with an intensity which makes the music seem to become the very extension of our being.

Does this happen to performers?

I think it is precisely this notion which Donington had in mind when speaking about performers, he stated:

[it is] as though the music were our very own so closely identified do we become with it and so intimately are we absorbed into any deep hearing of it.²⁹

Thus, here in *Einfühlung* theory, we see reflected that total identification with the music cited in chapter one as one of the characteristics of a good performance situation:³⁰ the music seems to express the performer's deepest emotions and thoughts and so he throws himself, heart and soul into the act of playing -- he "lives" that

musical work.

But, even were one to accept the notion of the mind supposing itself at one with the object, i.e. of the "disappearance of the twofold consciousness of subject and object," what is being referred to by that "enrichment of experience" mentioned earlier?³¹

Here, we may glance back at chapter one again.³² As was mentioned there, while the performer may totally identify with the music, it is not exclusively his own; i.e., anyone capable of listening to the composition can experience the music no less privately and no less personally. Thus, in an important way, an experience of *Einfühlung* carries one beyond personal feelings and emotions into a greater, more universal conception of man as a whole, together with his complex emotional and intellectual attributes. As Volkelt suggests, our consciousness expands from our own personal concerns to those of all humanity, we transcend in the deepest sense "selfishness" and reach a greater, less biased understanding of our complex nature.³³

In Lee's earliest formulations of the theory of Empathy, and in the writings of Karl Groos,³⁴ great stress was laid upon the importance of bodily postures. Here the theory indicated that the projection of the self into the object was so complete that the contemplator of a statue, for example, might unconsciously imitate its posture and implied movements by definite muscular adjustments.

While Lipps and Vokelt recognize the existence of such "spontaneous mimicry" they nonetheless stress that *Einfuhlung* does not consist of these bodily movements themselves. Rather, *Einfuhlung* consists of the emotions and feelings of which these bodily movements are the external symptoms. While these external symptoms may serve to intensify the emotional response generated by works of art, they do not form an essential part of the act of *Einfuhlung* which may occur without any visible signs or symptoms.

In the same way, the performer's projection of his own emotional being into the musical composition may be so complete as to cause him to unconsciously exhibit facial expressions or greater bodily gestures or postures. In chapter one,³⁶ we stated that these were acceptable as long as they occurred in response to the music. Here, in Lee's notion of "spontaneous mimicry" we see a possible explanation as to why they occur. It must also be pointed out, however, that such reactions are not essential, thus, performers must never deliberately cultivate them.

Earlier, it was indicated, that the art-work itself had an important, no less equal part to play in the aesthetic experience of *Einfuhlung*. Accordingly, we must now ask: what kind, or kinds of formal elements will elicit from the observer a type of *Einfuhlung* response? Will any formal shape or pattern do? Are there conditions which the perceived art work must meet before it can elicit an

Einfuhlung type response?

Both Lipps and Vokelt recognize that in order to be made expressive of human feeling, i.e. to facilitate the projection of feeling, the structure of an art work must display certain essential characteristics. These characteristics are enumerated by Lipps as "Three Great Laws" for the realization of form,³⁷ and by Vokelt as "Four Great Norms."³⁸ Vokelt's, in fact, attempt to articulate the necessary conditions, both subjective and objective for the realization of beauty.

Both writers indicate that a form should exhibit:

- (1) Unity of Form and Content; the former must symbolize the latter. In other words the dynamic structure of the content must sufficiently resemble the formal structure of the art work so that the content may be easily recognizable within it.
- (2) Unity amid Variety; the separate parts must retain their individuality while at the same time exhibiting their relationship to each other and to the whole to which they all belong. The object, so must present itself as an organic whole.
- (3) Unity through the dominance of a certain aspect or quality; the content, once perceived in the form, will dominate every part so that even the smallest detail will be seen as functional in the articulation of the overall "whole" or idea.
- (4) Value; Vokelt contends that a work of art must reveal,

through its content, a definitive human value capable of expanding man's consciousness from his own personal concerns to those of humanity as a whole.

Do musical compositions exhibit those characteristics?

In the succeeding chapters of this thesis we shall try to seek an answer. To summarize then, *Einfuhlung*:

- (1) consists of the projection of vital feeling into an art object;
- (2) is neither wholly subjective nor wholly objective;
- (3) is relatively selfless;
- (4) is characterized by the spontaneous and immediate nature of the projection which;
- (5) renders it incapable of explanation by association or recollection; rather it is seen as
- (6) a deeper psychic process which destroys the dual nature of subject and object making them seem as one;
- (7) Because of the intense nature of *Einfuhlung* motor reactions may occur. These, while they may intensify or facilitate Empathy, nevertheless are merely symptoms of the emotions projected;
- (8) The form or structure of the art object should exhibit certain characteristics before an act of *Einfuhlung* may occur.

How may Performance be explained in terms of *Einfuhlung*?

- (1) Performance consists of the projection of vital feeling (i.e. the performer's) into the art object (i.e. the music composition);

- (2) Performance is neither wholly subjective nor wholly objective, i.e. it involves a unique relationship between a subject-performer and an object-musical composition;
- (3) Performance is relatively selfless, i.e. as explained in chapter one, the performer is as concerned about the musical composition as he is about himself;
- (4) Performance is characterized by the spontaneous and immediate nature of the projection, i.e. it has a spontaneous, vivid, "now" or present tense quality; which,
- (5) renders it incapable of explanation by association or recollection, i.e. performance involves responding to the music as it occurs, not trying to resurrect a remembered response; rather it is seen as
- (6) a deeper psychic process which destroys the dual nature of subject and object, making them seem as one, i.e. so closely identified does the performer become with the music that it feels as though it were his very own -- as though he could "live" it.
- (7) Because of the intense nature of this identification with the music, motor reactions may occur, i.e. the performer may indicate by facial gestures, for example, the nature of his response. As long as these derive from and are concentrated on the music composition, they may and usually will facilitate the audience's emotional response to the music;

- (8) The form or structure of the art object, i.e. the music composition, should fulfill certain conditions³⁹ before an act of Einfuhlung -- (on the part of the performer) can occur.

Final Note: In suggesting that Performance can be explained in terms of Einfuhlung, we are speaking of course of the "Ideal" Performance. The concept of performer described in Einfuhlung is that sought-after "Ideal," which all performers long to achieve but rarely succeed in achieving. Such experiences do occur, however, and have been described as "happenings"; "magical events"; as "taking off" and as one listener said of just such a recital: "The performer seemed to get so involved that she made the piano "talk"."

This thesis is my personal attempt to try to understand the nature of these "happenings." Those "happenings" -- rare as they are -- make the art of performance immensely worthwhile.

Footnotes

¹Theodor Lipps, "Empathy and Aesthetic Pleasure" in Aesthetic Theories, Karl Aschenbrenner and Arnold Isenberg (eds.) (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1965).
 _____, Empathy, Inner Imitation and Sense Feelings in A Modern Book of Aesthetics, Melvin Rader (ed.) 3rd ed. (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1960).
 _____, "Raumaesthetik" in Modern Aesthetics: An Historical Introduction. Earl of Listowel (London: G. Allen, 1967).

²J. Vokelt, "System der Asthetik" in Modern Aesthetics. Listowel, op. cit.

³Vernon Lee, The Beautiful (Cambridge: Cambridge, 1913).

_____, and Anstruther Thompson, C., Beauty and Ugliness (London: Lane, 1912).

⁴R. Vischer, "Uber das Optische Formgefuhl" in Modern Aesthetics. Listowel, op. cit.

⁵Einfuhlung "feeling into" -- derived from a verb "to feel oneself into something" (sich in Etwas Einfuhlen); Vernon Lee, The Beautiful, op. cit.

⁶R. Vischer, "Uber das Optische Formgefuhl" in Modern Aesthetics. Listowel, op. cit.

⁷Theodor Lipps, Asthetik Vol. II, p. 12, in Modern Aesthetics. Listowel, op. cit.

⁸Vernon Lee and C. Anstruther-Thompson, Beauty and Ugliness, op. cit., p. 142.

⁹Monroe Beardsley, Aesthetics (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1958), pp. 454-489.

¹⁰R. Vischer, "Uber das Optische Formgefuhl" in Modern Aesthetics. Listowel, op. cit.

¹¹Alfred North Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas (New York: The Free Press, 1967), p. 176.

¹²Ibid., p. 176.

¹³Leonard B. Meyer, Explaining Music (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1973).

¹⁴T. Lipps in A Modern Book of Aesthetics, Melvin Rader (ed.) 4th ed. (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1973), p. 354.

¹⁵"This act of projection follows perception immediately and blends our personality with the object." R. Vischer, "Über das Optische Formgefühl" in Modern Aesthetics. Listowel, op. cit.

¹⁶See Chapter One, p. 31.

¹⁷Ibid.

¹⁸... "in empathy, I am not the Real I, but am inwardly released from this ego; that is, I am released from all that I am apart from the contemplation of form. I am only this ideal I, this contemplating I". Lipps, "Ästhetik" p. 247 quoted in Wilhelm Worringer, Abstraktion und Einfühlung (1908: twelfth edition, 1921, translated by Melvin Rader and Bernard Freyd as Abstraction and Empathy (New York: International Universities, 1953).

¹⁹See chapter one, p. 20.

²⁰I am indebted to Eamonn Callan for pointing out this distinction to me.

²¹I am indebted to Douglas Simak here, for pointing out this analogy to me.

²²See chapter one, p. 7.

²³Ibid., p. 24.

²⁴Ibid., p. 24.

²⁵Ibid., p. 24.

²⁶[The] ... "process is something deeper, different ... [to association] ... and rooted deeply in the innate structures of the human mind." T. Lipps in Modern Aesthetics. Listowel, op. cit.

"Einfühlung is not a variety of association, it is an "Einschmelzung" -- a spontaneous infusion of the percept with an emotional content by means of an unconscious psychic process." J. Vokelt, "System der Ästhetik", pp. 179-181 in Modern Aesthetics. Listowel, op. cit.

²⁷Melvin Rader, (ed.) A Modern Book of Aesthetics. 4th edition. op. cit., p. 355.

²⁸Vernon Lee, The Beautiful, op. cit.

²⁹See chapter one, p. 21.

³⁰Ibid., p. 21.

³¹See chapter two, p. 54.

³²Chapter one, p. 21.

³³For an extensive treatment of Art's capacity to transcend selfish interests see Iris Murdoch, The Sovereignty of Good (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1970).

³⁴Karl Groos, "Einleitung in die Asthetik." "The kernel of all aesthetic enjoyment whatever is the activity or play of inner emotion whereby we imitate internally the mental or material features of an external object" in Modern Aesthetics. Listowel, op. cit., pp. 82-89.

³⁵"Motor sensations are the intermediaries that facilitate the act of Einfühlung." J. Vokelt, "System der Asthetik" in Modern Aesthetics. Listowel, op. cit.

³⁶Chapter one, p. 26.

³⁷T. Lipps, Three Great Laws:

- (1) Law of Uniformity
 - (2) Law of Unity and Variety
 - (3) Monarchic Subordination
- in Modern Aesthetics. Listowel, op. cit.

³⁸J. Vokelt, Four Great Norms:

- (1) for the subject, a contemplative attitude; for the object unity of form and content.
- (2) for the subject, intensity capable of grouping and reducing to a unity, diverse elements; for the object, an ability to exhibit itself as an organic whole;
- (3) for the subject, a temporary banishment of egotistical impulses;
- (4) for the object, a capacity to reveal through its content a definite human value.

J. Vokelt in Modern Aesthetics. Listowel, op. cit.

³⁹See footnotes 37 and 38 above.

III. MUSIC COMPOSITIONS AS SYMBOLS OF FEELING

It may be seen from the previous chapter, that an act of Einfuhlung can only occur if the form of the object is structured in such a way as to facilitate (i.e. evoke in some way), and present (i.e. express), the projected mental life. Lipps and Vokelt suggested four important characteristics which the form of the art object should exhibit before any act of Einfuhlung can become possible. Within the context of the theory being examined, from the viewpoint of performance, then, a music composition should be designed in such a way as will exhibit these four characteristics, if the performer is to perceive it as somehow expressive of his own subjective mental life.

It follows, accordingly, that our original hypothesis that performance can be explained in terms of the theory of Einfuhlung depends upon the ability of music compositions to present or express our inner mental lives and which, in so doing, encompass the four important characteristics suggested by Lipps and Vokelt.

There are a number of questions which must be asked here: can music express the highly complex qualities of our inner mental lives? Most musicians would answer emphatically, yes! but, one must ask, why? -- what is the nature of this expression? how does it occur? Does it involve, in an important way, the four characteristics listed by Lipps and

Vokelt? Now too, we must ask: what exactly is meant by "unity of form and content?", "unity amidst variety" and so on.

In seeking to find a firm philosophical foundation to which to base the claim that music can and does express the highly complex qualities of our emotional lives, one immediately runs into problems. If one consults musico-logical sources, one tends to find essentially "acts of faith" which largely assume that, as most musicians believe, music can and does express emotion. On the other hand, if one seeks an answer in aesthetic theory, one finds oneself restricted to a rather limited range of material. Unlike the visual arts which have always shown an active interest in aesthetics, the musical arts, up until comparatively recently, have largely ignored aesthetic theory. Moreover, music as an art form, for whatever reason, if one compares it to the visual arts, has received much less rigorous attention from aestheticians. Accordingly, the selection of Susanne K. Langer's philosophy of art for examination and discussion in this thesis was not made on a purely arbitrary basis, or because it happened to concur with many of the notions mentioned in chapter two. Rather, Susanne K. Langer's philosophy of art: 1) is one of the most influential of the present day; 2) specifically addresses itself to the art form, music; 3) suggests a connection between music and human feeling so is entirely relevant to our purposes; and 4) in dealing with music offers some

illuminating insights into those important characteristics put forward by Lipps and Vokelt. This is not to suggest that Langer specifically addresses herself to Einfuhlung theory. In fact, throughout her work, Einfuhlung as such is never mentioned. On the other hand, in developing her thesis that "music is symbolic of human feeling," she offers valuable insights into many of the essential notions involved in Lipps' and Vokelt's characteristics.

Accordingly, her theory is included here with a specific purpose in mind, namely: its capacity to yield important insights into, 1) how music and human feeling may be connected; and 2) the important characteristics suggested by Lipps and Vokelt.

While selecting and using a particular theory to explain and develop aspects of another can be extremely useful and thought-provoking, it also poses some problems. For example: does using a particular theory to explain another imply that one is assuming the first theory to be valid and correct?, i.e. in using Langer's theory to explain Einfuhlung theory, is there an implicit assumption that Langer functions as a kind of not-to-be questioned authority figure whose ideas give substance and support to some of the central notions of Einfuhlung theory?

Here, it must be immediately stated that such an assumption is definitely not intended in this thesis. Langer's theory, while enormously important and influential is also extremely problematic and very controversial as a

glance at many philosophical journals will show. However, in using one theory to explain another, one runs the risk of getting side-tracked, i.e. devoting time and space to examining and discussing controversial aspects of the explanatory theory and thus impeding the overall flow of the thesis' main subject area. Thus, while it is an important and necessary task that Langer's theory be questioned and examined, for reasons of time and space, this cannot occur in this thesis except in the most superficial manner. Accordingly, having introduced the main body of her work, we will outline briefly some of the main areas of contention, together with some of the more important objections made in response to her theory. Having stated these, we will go on to use aspects of her theory to explain aspects of Einfuhlung, coping with or at least identifying possible contentious viewpoints as we go along.

Susanne K. Langer set forth her philosophy of art in a series of books. In her most well-known book, Philosophy in a New Key¹ (1942) she expounded the fundamental notion of symbolization as the connective link between fields as disparate as music, science, and religion. Then, in Feeling and Form² (1953) she generalized her theory to encompass all the arts and in her Problems of Art³ (1957), Philosophical Sketches⁴ (1962) and Mind⁵ Vol. I (1967) she responded to her critics by reformulating some of her basic ideas.

As to some of the more contentious aspects of her theory:

1) Langer is convinced that "art is essentially one" which, as Dickie suggests,⁶ means that she thinks a definition of art in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions can be given. The notion of art being thus definable is highly contentious and has been brought into question in recent times by writers such as Morris Weitz.⁷

2) Her theory of art consists of: (a) a definition of art, and (b), a thesis about how art functions encompassing aspects of what would usually be described as the theory of "aesthetic experience". The notion of combining a theory of "Art" with a theory of "Aesthetic Experience" is problematic only because she fails to make clear the distinction between the two, an omission which leads easily to confusion on the reader's part. As *Einfuhlung* is presented in this thesis as a theory of "aesthetic experience," and, as we are proposing to use aspects of Langer's "theory of art" (which will at times overlap into "aesthetic experience"), it may be useful to outline the distinction between the two.

A theory of "Art" focuses on the concept of Art, asks what is it (i.e. Art), and seeks to capture its "essence" in a definition or theory.⁸ How do those philosophers working within an essentialist framework arrive at such a definition or theory? They examine works of art and try to find a property or group of properties common to all of them. Thus, when Langer defines Art as "the creation of

forms symbolic of human feeling,"⁹ she means that all art works symbolize human feeling, that this "symbolization of human feeling" constitutes the "essence" of Art and if a so-called Art work fails to "symbolize human feeling" then it isn't Art. Conversely, if something does "symbolize human feeling," then that something is Art.

A theory of "Aesthetic Experience," by contrast focuses on the concept of the "Aesthetic," suggests that a distinctive kind of experience called "aesthetic" can be isolated and described, and seeks to capture its "essence" in a theory or definition.¹⁰ How do those philosophers who accept the notion of a distinguishable "aesthetic" experience arrive at their theory or definition? They examine people's aesthetic experiences and try to extract aspects common to all of them. Thus, when Einfuhlung is defined as the "act whereby we bestow on things our own soul and its moods," it means that the bestowal on things of the spectator's own soul, etc. constitutes the "essence" of the aesthetic experience; and, that whenever this occurs one may correctly describe the experience as "aesthetic". Where theories of Art, however, focus attention totally on works of Art, theories of "Aesthetic Experience" focus attention on the person having the experience plus the object (usually a work of art but not necessarily so) perceived, which is the focus or cause of the aesthetic experience. So, in seeking to isolate and describe the peculiar effects which a work of art can have on the person

experiencing it, aspects of a theory of art may be extremely relevant. Thus, it is not unreasonable to propose that Langer's notion of art as "the creation of forms symbolic of human feeling" may help to explain the part that the work of art has to play in the experience of *Einfühlung*. Here, a theory of art serves to illuminate the role of the art work in Aesthetic Experience.

3) Langer's view of art confuses the definition of art with a statement of what makes art good. Thus, she states (speaking of the art symbol formulating the appearance of feeling): "this function every good work of art does perform."¹¹ The adjective "good" is misleading here for if Langer's theory is correct, then all art -- good or bad -- formulates the appearance of feeling. Some art may do it better than others, but by her definition, all art does it. This criticism of her work reflects a present trend in aesthetic theory which insists that the conception of art must be kept independent of the criterion of good art.¹²

4) Throughout her theory of art, Langer assigns a somewhat unusual meaning to the term "symbol". Indeed, this unusual meaning has proved to be very problematic for her theory causing critics either to totally misunderstand her notion of symbolic function; or else, assuming they do understand what she means, causing resentment among them because she advocates a meaning or use of the word "symbol" which differs greatly from the accepted usage in semantical writings. As we will deal with her notion of symbol later,

we shall not examine it now. However, it must be identified as one of the most contentious aspects of her theory.¹³

5) In developing her notion as to the way in which art works symbolize human feeling, Langer insists that this differs radically from the way in which language symbolizes abstract ideas. In fact, as Rader suggests,¹⁴ her theory is essentially based upon the distinction between two types of symbolism, i.e. the discursive which we find in pure science, and the presentational which confronts us in art.

Two major objections come to mind here:

(1) Langer's view of science appears somewhat outdated -- some might even call it a nineteenth century rather than a twentieth century view of science. She seems to espouse the notion that science and art deal with radically different aspects of existence. Here, science is seen as dealing with the more objective side of existence, i.e. by implication, the less emotional side or, as Rader construes her notion, "the more neutral aspects of our experience of the world," the ideas and facts that are least tinged by subjective feelings."¹⁵ Art, on the other hand, deals with the subjective side of existence, i.e. subjective experience, the character of inner life, by implication our emotions and feelings. This kind of attitude, all too easily can lead one perilously close to the well-known dictum which submits that where science pertains to truth (with all the objective connotations we associate with "truth"); art pertains to beauty (with all the subjective connotations we

associate with beauty). Now, this view of science as the passionless, unemotional pursuit of the objectively verifiable has been brought into question by Thomas S. Kuhn, whose work The Structure of Scientific Revolutions¹⁶ has done much to show science as a thoroughly human (and so in part subjective) enterprise. As a consequence of this, Langer's notion that art and science deal with radically different sides of existence is simply overstated. Moreover, much of the recent work written on art as a mode of cognition¹⁷ (a notion which Langer totally agrees with -- indeed she even suggests it herself in Problems of Art¹⁸), has even more clearly highlighted the similarities between art and science.

Thus, in the light of recent developments, Langer's notion of a radical distinction between science and art may be no longer tenable.

(2) Langer's depiction of "discursive symbolism," i.e. language in its literal use is also extremely problematic. In fact, her entire treatment of the symbolic system language is unsatisfactory largely because of the unnecessary vagueness of much of her work which, all too easily, leads to total confusion on the part of her readers. Because of this very vagueness one can never be entirely sure that one is being fair in one's criticisms of her work. However, one could seriously object to her treatment of the symbolic device, language, on the grounds that it appears to present a very narrow and limited view of how language symbols work.

This is all the more serious when one considers that it is with this narrow, limited notion of language symbolism that she compares and starkly contrasts the symbolic device she terms art. Thus, throughout her work one finds statements such as:

art works function as symbols of the whole subjective side of existence which language is peculiarly unfit to convey.¹⁹

or:

A work of art symbolizes ... "subjective experience, the character of so called inner life which ... the normal use of words ... is peculiarly unable to articulate, and which therefore we can only refer to in a general and quite superficial way."²⁰

Now, on reading either of the above, one could justifiably argue in objection, that ordinary language contains a very rich and varied vocabulary for the expression and understanding of mental states, including feelings, and so ordinary language itself could in fact be seen as a powerful vehicle for presenting the whole subjective side of existence. Moreover, the expressive qualities of literature could even be regarded as parasitic²¹ on this aspect of ordinary language. If this is true, then one cannot differentiate ordinary language and art in terms of the capacity of one to symbolize the subjective dimension of experience. Why then does Langer appear to espouse such a narrow view of language symbols?

She appears to be making an important distinction between language in its "literal," "practical" use²² and what might be termed language in its "expressive" use.

Now, when we use language in a literal, practical way, we use it primarily to refer to something else, i.e. we use words with their literal meanings in mind. Literal meaning here suggests "relatively fixed meanings," i.e. dictionary meanings and in situations where the literal use of language is involved, the total meaning of a discourse is built up by using the words (with their literal meanings) successively. Langer also suggests that when one uses words thus literally, one is much more concerned with the message or meaning being conveyed than with the means used to convey it, i.e. one focuses more on what is being conveyed or communicated and hardly at all on how that communication is being achieved. Thus, if I'm asked: do I want eggs or cereal for breakfast? I know immediately what is being referred to, and I make my choice based on that knowledge without any uncertainties as to what is being communicated, and so, no undue deliberations on the words used. While one could not disagree with Langer about this efficient, practical use of language, one could however point out that it surely constitutes only a very small part of the way we use language. In other words, during the course of our day to day lives, we frequently encounter situations which evoke in us various kinds of emotional responses. When this occurs, and we wish to articulate and communicate our response, we don't ordinarily rush off and create a work of art in order to express this emotional response. Rather, we talk about it, i.e. we "express" how we feel in words,

and while words may sometimes seem relatively inadequate, they hardly merit being called general and superficial. So, because we do frequently use language to express the more subjective aspects of our experience, Langer's claim that art works symbolize what language is "incapable" of expressing is far too strong. Were she to reply that it is scientists who use language in the literal way she describes, one could counter argue that while scientific reports or textbooks may use such language, it seems unlikely that scientists themselves, during the course of their everyday work, limit themselves to a literal use of language. Even were they to do so, this would still constitute only a small part of how language is used every day. To sum up: Langer's differentiation of art and language on the basis that only one of them is capable of expressing the subjective side of existence, is untenable.

Finally, and even more important, the notion that words have "fixed meanings" was brought into question by Wittgenstein²³ whose notion of "meaning as use" completely changed the philosophy of language. This notion of "the meaning is the use" could have significant effects on Langer's notion of both the art symbol and the language symbol. To explore this, however, is outside the scope of this thesis.

6) In developing her theory of art, Langer commenced with a theory of music and then expanded it to include the other art forms. While the theory of music, generally considered

as the most original feature of her theory, may be deemed successful and certainly insightful, her attempt to broaden her theory to include other art forms cannot be said to have been as successful. However, consideration of the other art forms is not our concern here.

7) Finally, Langer's notion that music symbolizes emotional feelings pertains especially to music written during the Romantic period, 1750-1900. The twentieth century saw a major change in musical style which established a shift in emphasis away from the notion of music symbolizing emotional feelings. Her theory then, while capable of yielding important insights into eighteenth and nineteenth century music, cannot be said to apply to music in general. As we are concerned here with the music of exactly that period (1750-1900), Langer's theory may be considered both relevant and important.

Having stated some of the more important objections to Langer's philosophy of art, we must go on to examine her theory of music. Before we do so, however, let us first state her definition of art.

Art is the creation of forms symbolic of human feeling.²⁴

In this thesis, it is intended to focus on the "work" of art. So, from this definition of art as a general human enterprise we can infer the following definition of the term "work of art".

A work of art is a form created in such a way as to be symbolic of human feeling.

As a musical composition may be considered a work of art, we may infer a similar definition of a musical composition. Thus:

A music composition is a form created in such a way as to be symbolic of human feeling.

Throughout the remainder of the chapter we will be examining and quoting key aspects of Langer's notion of the art work. As she uses the term "art-work" we will continue to use it here. However, it may always be read as: the art work, i.e. for example, a music composition. There are three key concepts in the definitions mentioned above -- "form", "symbolic" and "feeling" -- each of which needs to be carefully examined. Langer offers the following explanation of the word "feeling":²⁵

The word 'feeling', must be taken here in its broadest sense, meaning everything that can be felt, from physical sensation, pain and comfort, excitement and repose, to the most complex emotions, intellectual tensions, or the steady feeling tones of a conscious human life.

Could this notion of "feeling" be equated with Einfuhlung's notion of "mental life"? Certainly, her definition of "feeling" is broad enough to make such a connection reasonable. However, she herself, perhaps unknowingly, makes that connection by referring to works of art as "projections of 'felt life' as Henry James called it" and as

images of what otherwise would be ...
literally ineffable: direct awareness, emotion, vitality, personal identity -- life lived and felt, the matrix of mentality.²⁶

Thus, while it might be argued that Langer's notion of mental life seems to be broader²⁷ than the one employed in *Einfühlung*, both theories seem to espouse the notion that art works are expressive of human mental life.

Having ascertained what she means by feeling, we must now ask: what is meant by the word "form"?

Form in its most abstract sense means structure, articulation, a whole resulting from the relation of mutually dependent factors, or more precisely, the way the whole is put together.²⁸

There is a very important qualification here which must not be missed -- she is speaking of form in its most abstract sense. Here, Langer is seeking to distinguish her use of the word "form" from that which denotes characteristic structures in art such as sonata form, symphonic form, or variation form. This characteristic usage constitutes only a very small part of what she means. In her definition, the word "form" is to be understood in a much wider sense which on the one hand is close to the commonest, popular meaning, namely, just the "shape" of a thing, and on the other hand, she insists,

to the quite unpopular meaning it has in science and philosophy, where it designates something more abstract.²⁹

This abstract sense of form, she calls "logical form"³⁰ and it refers basically to the interrelations we perceive among the various dimensions of things³¹ -- in the case of art, art objects. In other words, when we listen to a piece of music -- let us say a tune, or melody -- we don't just hear

a collection of disconnected notes or sound stimuli, rather we hear a structural whole, i.e. a "tune". How do we manage to make a single "tune" out of what could be termed a mere collection of notes? Putting it very briefly, we perceive the notes as being related to one another in some way, i.e. we hear each note individually but, as we hear it, we connect it to those notes which came before it and probably form some hypothesis as to what note or notes are likely to follow it. In other words, the "tune" constitutes a unity amidst variety -- there is a variety of notes, out of which we make a single whole or unit, i.e. a tune. The way in which the tune is put together -- the intricate pattern of interrelationships created by the composer and perceived by us spectators constitutes Langer's notion of abstract, i.e. logical form. In presenting it as a "whole resulting from the relation of mutually dependent factors"³² Langer's notion of logical form may be connected to that unity amidst variety listed by Lipps and Vokelt as the second essential characteristic which art forms must exhibit in order to evoke an *Einfuhlung*-type response.³³

Now, we must ask: what is meant by the term "symbolize"?

The word "symbolize" means: "to serve as a symbol of". Accordingly let us ask then, what is the meaning of the term "symbol"?

As has already been indicated, Langer's use of the term "symbol" has been strongly criticized by a number of

philosophers. In order to understand some of the problems here, let us commence by asking what is normally meant by the term "symbol"?

By a symbol [may be understood] any occurrence (or type of occurrence), usually linguistic in status, which is taken to signify something else by way of tacit or explicit conventions or rules of language.³⁴

A word -- a familiar common noun is a symbol of this sort. It conveys a concept and refers to or denotes whatever exemplifies that concept. Thus, the word lion conveys what we call the concept of lion and denotes any being that exemplifies that concept, i.e. any lion. In the same way, the mark on the music score "symbolizes", i.e. signifies, refers to a particular note, and is conventionally accepted as doing exactly that.

Now, words are rarely used in isolation. Instead we tend to use them in complex combinations (sentences). But, when words are strung together in sentences, another function of symbols comes into play. Here, not only do some of the words name things, but something further is conveyed by the way those words are put together, i.e. some sort of relation is symbolized between concepts of things. Thus, if it is said "a cat is in the room," it is conveyed that there is some sort of relation between the cat and the room, i.e. one is "in" the other. Now, there is no thing which "in" refers to, so the symbolic relation involved here is much different than that which we find in simple cases of references. Here, Langer would suggest that what is

conveyed are ideas or notions "about" things.³⁵ Thus, when we say "a cat is in the room," we are saying something "about" the cat, i.e. she is "in" the room. The important distinction to be grasped here is the distinction between naming and asserting. When we use a word to name something, all we really do is mention or refer to that something. If, on the other hand, we want to say something about that "something" we make what may be called an assertion. Here, we symbolize some sort of relation between concepts of things or perhaps things and properties. For example, when we say "lemons are sour" we make an assertion that the property of sourness may be attributed to lemons..

Assertions may be true or false and language is capable of conveying both true and false assertions. When they are true, we call them "facts". So, to sum up briefly, we use words as symbols to refer to things, and complex word combinations, i.e. statements, to refer to facts or perhaps possibilities, even impossibilities "about" things. Moreover, because language is a conventionally accepted symbolic system, we can use it to communicate those facts and things to each other.

While Langer recognizes that one of the chief offices of the symbol system we call language is to refer to things and communicate facts, she nonetheless insists that the importance of these uses has led semanticists to regard them as the defining properties of symbols³⁶ -- that is, to think of a symbol solely as something which stands for something

else and is used to represent that thing in discourse.

This preoccupation, Langer asserts, has caused semanticists to neglect the more primitive function of symbols which is:³⁷

to formulate experience as something imaginable
in the first place -- to fix entities, and
formulate facts This function is "articulation".
Symbols articulate³⁸ ideas.

What is she trying to get at here?

Here, it appears, she is trying to emphasize the point that as a public symbol system language is not just a way of expressing ideas and feelings we already have but a way of refining and giving shape to ideas and feelings we come to have. In other words, thought as we know it and use it, can only occur where ideas have taken shape, and art and language, both symbolic processes, are among the ways in which we give form and connection, clarity and proportion to our sense impressions, memories, feelings and so on. Or, as Paul H. Hirst succinctly expresses it:

All intelligent thought involves the use of
symbols, and most frequently the use of words.³⁹

Now, when we "think" of something, while we may imagine it, i.e. give it some sort of symbolic shape in our heads, unless we utter it or express it in some sort of way as will enable it to be understood by others, it will not achieve communication. But, earlier we cited communication as one of the chief functions of symbols. So, if thought does not involve communication, what are the functions of symbols in thought? This is precisely the question which Langer seeks to answer. Moreover, she insists that the

answer to that question brings us to the greatest intellectual value and she believes, the prime office of symbols: this, she states as:

their power of formulating experience and presenting it objectively for contemplation, logical intuition, recognition, understanding.⁴⁰

In other words, by using symbols in our thoughts, we are enabled to imagine things. Not only that, we are enabled to imagine relations between things which in real life we could never have seen -- a man-goat, with a man's head and torso but with goat's legs, for example. Also, by means of thought we may examine and reflect upon things (contemplation). We may imagine and consider different aspects of our past experiences and so come to understand them. When faced with difficult decisions which require action on our parts, we may imagine and consider (contemplate) several alternatives, eventually choosing one based on the greater understanding which thought enabled us to achieve. In thought, we can consider and reflect upon situations which in real life could evoke in us intense anguish -- the death of a parent for example. In other words, symbols in thought "present" concepts or things for us to reflect upon, examine, accept, reject, recognize and most of all, for us to understand.

Now, it is Langer's contention that works of art symbolize human feeling in exactly the way described above: i.e., they "present" objectively something, i.e. the life of feeling, the character of inner life for contemplation,

recognition and understanding, hence she insists they merit being called symbols. It is by virtue of art works that we are enabled to formulate, i.e. conceive of and articulate "subjective experience", the character of "inner life".⁴¹

At this point, it may be helpful to connect Langer's notion of "Feeling" (as described earlier⁴²) to her notion of "subjective experience" and "inner life". By "subjective experience", Langer means the "subjective aspect" of experience, the direct feeling of it:⁴¹ i.e. what it feels like to be waking and moving; to be drowsy and slowing down; to be very anxious and then very relieved when the cause of anxiety is dealt with and so resolved; to be flying high with enthusiasm and then to be stopped suddenly in one's tracks; to be terrificly excited about something, or to be calm and self-assured; to feel self-sufficient but alone; what it feels like to pursue an elusive thought or to have a big idea. All such directly felt experiences, Langer maintains,⁴⁴ usually have no names -- they are named, if at all, for the outward conditions that usually accompany their occurrence. Only the most striking ones have names like "anger", "fear", "hate", "love" and are collectively called emotion. But we feel many things that never develop into any designable emotion. As Langer states it:

The ways we are moved are as various as lights in a forest; and they may intersect, sometimes without cancelling each other, take shape and dissolve, conflict, explode into passion, or be transfigured. All these inseparable elements of subjective reality compose what we call the "inward life" of human beings.⁴⁵

Now, it is because so many of these feeling states are indescribable in words, that Langer suggests that an alternative symbolic device -- Art -- has been developed to articulate them.⁴⁶ However, she does admit that the more striking of them have names and as art-works frequently deal with those well-known emotions,⁴⁷ her claim that art works such as music compositions "symbolize" what language is "peculiarly unable to articulate" is still far too strong a claim.

It must be emphasized here again, however, that Langer does not construe art-symbols as "referring" to anything. Thus, she freely admits that an art symbol does not function in the way a genuine symbol's function is defined, i.e. "signification is not [their] semantic function,"⁴⁸ art symbols do not signify anything. However, because they do function in the way symbols function in thought, i.e. they formulate subjective experience and present it objectively for contemplation and understanding, they merit being called symbols, albeit "symbols" in a less often recognized sense of the term. To sum up: Artworks "symbolize", i.e. "present" not just signify human feeling.

Assuming that one accepts Langer's notion of art-works such as music compositions "symbolizing human feeling", i.e. articulating and presenting it objectively for contemplation and understanding. It must then be asked, how do they do this? How do they articulate (symbolize) human feeling?

This articulation is made possible by a congruence between the patterns of art and the patterns of sentience, i.e. human feeling.⁴⁹ At this point Langer invokes a well-known theory of Gestalt psychology -- that there may be a similarity of form between different fields of experience. As an understanding of this notion is crucial, it may be helpful to cite a concrete example from an essay by Carroll C. Pratt:⁵⁰

[In the appendix, p. 1] are two meaningless [non referential] forms. The reader will be able to decide without any trouble which of the meaningless sounds, 'uloomu' and 'takete', applies to each form. The demonstration shows that impressions from different sense departments may be very similar with respect to form. Each of the sounds, 'takete' and 'uloomu' fits perfectly one of the visual designs, but not the other. The impressions are different in content -- one is visual, the other auditory -- but similar in form.

Langer points out that such congruence of form holds not only between one sense department and another, but also between a pattern of sense and a pattern of feeling. Thus, she asserts:

The tonal structures we call music bear a close logical similarity to the forms of human feeling -- forms of growth and attenuation, flowing and stowing, conflict and resolution, speed, arrest, terrific excitement, calm.⁵¹

In other words, the structure or form of subjective experience, i.e. the feelings which underlie our entire experience, is paralleled or mirrored by the tonal structures we call music. Because of this mirroring, musical structures exhibit the appearance of feeling, i.e. they "sound" like what it "feels" to be awake and moving; to be drowsy and

slowing down; to be full of anxiety and be relieved when that anxiety is resolved; to be tremendously excited and tremendously calm; to be quiet and dream-like and full of resolute determination. Music, thus, constitutes "a tonal analogue of emotive life."⁵² Dickie, at this point, suggests⁵³ that while Langer does not explicitly use the word "iconic" or "iconic symbol", in fact, her theory really implies that a work of art is an "iconic" symbol of human feeling. An iconic symbol is a symbol which resembles in some way what it signifies; for example, a highway sign with two crossed lines is an iconic symbol because the sign resembles the crossroads it signifies. Most symbols are not iconic, but, one would have to admit, that Langer's notion of music being a tonal analogue of emotive life certainly seems to point her work in that direction. Here, however, one has to remember that she explicitly denies that musical structures "refer" to or signifies human feeling;⁵⁴ -- rather they "present" it objectively for recognition and understanding. Now, the way in which music compositions "present" human feeling, i.e. the "form" they take in order to do it, relates to Langer's earlier definition of form. Accordingly, let us examine the "form" of symbols which present, i.e. "presentational" symbols.

A presentational art symbol, i.e. a music composition is a single symbol. In other words an art symbol is the work as a whole, one where each part, while maintaining a certain separateness nevertheless is intrinsically connected

both to all the other parts and to the whole wherein they are all incorporated.⁵⁵ In a musical composition, every element, i.e. every note or group of notes, is functional in the articulation of the total meaning, i.e. has a necessary and vital part to contribute to the meaning of the composition as a whole. Because of this, because every note is necessary and important one cannot take out a group of notes and substitute others without changing the intrinsic nature of the entire composition, i.e. the "meaning" of the composition can only be articulated in the form it already has; if one changed that form, one would have a different composition and so a different meaning not the same meaning expressed in a different way. Moreover, in an art work, the elements, i.e. the notes, are in an important sense 'used' with their contribution to the work as a whole very much in mind. Thus, in a way they are always "seen" or apprehended within the context of the work as a whole, and while it is possible to analyze what they contribute to the work as a whole, it is impossible to assign them any of its "meaning" apart from or independent of that whole. In the same way, taking a highway sign of a railroad track as an example: the individual elements of the sign (i.e. the individual lines drawn) are seen or apprehended within the context of the sign as a whole. Thus, while it is possible to analyze what they contribute to the sign as a whole; i.e. it is possible to point to one line and say, for example, that it represents one side of the railroad

track; it is impossible to assign them any of its "meaning" apart from or independent of that whole; i.e. were we to take out that line and look at it all by itself, it would be impossible to recognize or identify it as part of a highway sign or a railroad track. Why is all of this important?

It is important because Langer's view of language leads her to believe that "discursive symbolism", i.e. language in its practical everyday use, functions in an entirely different way and that the concept of "meaning" normally associated with practical language cannot be applied to art-works. In order to understand this let us look briefly at her notion of language.

For Langer, words have relatively fixed meanings (dictionary meanings) which unlike the elements of art works function independently of the way they are being used in a particular context. Because of this, in practical discourse, one can take out a particular word, substitute another with a similar meaning without significantly altering the overall meaning of the discourse.⁵⁶ Finally, the "meaning" of a discursive symbol such as a word is "separable" from the symbol. To put it another way, a word as we use it, is really only a sign; in grasping its meaning our interest reaches beyond it to the concept. Its meaning lies elsewhere (in a dictionary, presumably) and "once we have grasped its connotation or identified something as its denotation"⁵⁷ we do not need the word any more.

Now, as we have already stated, Langer insists that an art symbol -- a work of art such as a musical composition -- does not point us to a meaning beyond its own presence. That which it "presents" cannot be grasped apart from the sensuous, artistic form that presents it. Because what art works formulate cannot be called "meaning" in the separable (i.e. capable of being paraphrased) sense of the word, Langer adopts a new term "import"⁵⁸ which she defines as being something like meaning but radically different in one important aspect: import is perceived as being in the work, articulated by it but not further abstracted. Thus art works, because they do not refer us to a meaning separable from themselves are not "symbols" in the ordinary sense. Instead, their "import" is presented in them.

Once again, one could object that the contrast with "discursive symbolism" is too starkly drawn. Words in ordinary language do not have absolutely fixed meanings but vary in subtle and often not so subtle ways from one context of utterance to another, though dictionaries perforce ignore this. Thus words, like constituent elements of art works could be said to have meaning in a way which is "context-dependent". This, in fact, is exactly what Wittgenstein had in mind when he suggested that if we laid aside preconceptions and studied words in their vital employment, we would discover that they have no fixed meanings and no sharp edges.⁵⁹ Indeed, if we adopt the notion, the "meaning is the use", the apparent chasm

between linguistic meaning and artistic "import" seems to evaporate. While the implications that Wittgenstein's work could have on Langer's notion of "meaning" and "import" can only be hinted at here, it is certainly an area that ought to be considered.

Now, we must reflect back a little and ask what is it that the art work, i.e. the single form or "whole" as it were "imports"? Here, Langer would answer "human feeling", "subjective experience", the "character of inner life". But, it might be stated: presentational symbols if they function as Langer described earlier⁶⁰ should present something "objectively" for contemplation, recognition and understanding. Does this mean that art works present "objectively", "subjective" experience?

This is exactly what Langer suggests and she states it thus:

They [i.e. art works] formulate [give symbolic shape to] ... that elusive aspect of reality that is commonly taken to be amorphous and chaotic; that is [they] objectify the subjective realm.⁶¹

Here, it is very important to understand clearly what is meant by "objectifying the subjective realm". The "subjective realm" constitutes the inner life of feeling. To "objectify" that inner life is to give intellectual access to pure subjectivity, i.e. to give coherence and shape to subjective experience. Or, as Langer also puts it:

They ... [works of art] formulate it [human feeling] ... for our cognition.⁶²

i.e. they present human feeling clearly and lucidly to our understanding. Here, one could reasonably ask: how do they do this? For example, how does a musical composition objectify subjective experience?

The answer lies in the ability of musical structures to "mirror" the forms of human feeling. Unfortunately, Langer never really rigorously develops her notion of musical structures being congruent with the forms of feeling. Instead, she seems content to state it in a manner which is highly suggestive but which fails to offer a thorough and meaningful explanation of how it occurs. Because the whole notion of "objectifying the subjective realm" depends upon a thorough understanding and explication of this crucial notion, however, we must examine much more carefully Langer's statement as to the alleged connection between musical structures and the forms of feeling, with the expressed intention of following through on possible implications contained therein.

Thus, let us ask: what is Langer suggesting when she states that:

The tonal structures we call music bear a close logical similarity to the forms of human feeling.⁶³

She is saying that musical structures "resemble" the forms of human feeling, i.e. that they look remarkably alike. Let's examine more carefully the notion of things looking alike: when we say that a chair (x) looks just like another chair (y), on what basis do we make this assertion?

We make the assertion based on our observation that the two chairs exhibit similar characteristics, e.g. they both have the same shape, are painted the same colour and so on. To put it another way, the chairs have similar properties, and on the basis of this similarity, we say they look alike. Earlier, we stated that Langer proposed that there may be a similarity of form between different fields of experience, i.e. between the structural forms of music and the forms of feeling, and, in order to try to understand this, we cited an example from Carroll C. Pratt.⁶⁴ Now, when Langer suggests that musical structures resemble or look like the forms of feeling, is she in fact implying that they have similar properties? Is it possible that the form of one field of experience can have similar properties to another entirely different field of experience?

In order to answer this, let us look again at Carroll C. Pratt's example⁶⁵ and ask what properties do the meaningless form (b) and the word "takete" have in common? Looking at the diagram of (b): one could say it has sharp, angular outlines; and, saying the word "takete" one could describe it as "sounding" sharp and angular and even "feeling" sharp and angular on the tongue. Thus, the properties which diagram (b) and the word takete have in common are sharpness and angularity. Similarly, diagram (a) and "uloomu" share the properties of roundness and the kind of "softness" one associates with a lack of angular outlines.

Is this the kind of resemblance which Langer had in mind when she stated that musical structures and the forms of human feeling bear a remarkable resemblance to one another? One would have to state immediately that she never explicitly refers to "properties".⁶⁶ On the other hand, her list of what presumably constitute the common characteristics of both musical structures and the forms of feeling⁶⁷ -- forms of growth, etc. -- could lend themselves well to such treatment. For example, one of the properties of calmness is slowness -- no feeling of haste. Music composition can have slow tempos with no feeling of haste. Thus, a comparison of music and feelings on the basis of common properties does seem possible. But, exhibiting the properties of a particular form of feeling does not necessarily mean that the feeling is actually being felt.⁶⁸ In other words, when we say of Beethoven's Adagio section from the sonata op. 110, that it expresses despair and sadness, we obviously do not mean that the composition itself is "feeling" sad and despairing. Rather, we mean that the composition exhibits the properties (the "look") of despair and sadness; i.e. when one is despairing and sad, one walks slowly, talks quietly and slowly, the lines on one's face tend to droop downward; similarly Beethoven's Adagio has a very slow tempo, tends in an overall sense to soft dynamics, and uses descending melodic patterns. Here, the musical composition exhibits the properties of a particular emotional state, properties which we all

exhibit, use and most important recognize in our everyday lives.

Now, just as musical compositions can exhibit the properties of feelings without actually feeling them, so too human beings can appear to be feeling something yet, in fact, not be feeling it at all.⁶⁹ For example, one can exhibit all of the properties of enthusiasm without feeling remotely enthusiastic. So, too, a composer may compose a musical piece exhibiting all of the properties of a particular emotion, yet he may himself be "actually" experiencing an entirely different emotion. Thus, he can write a symphony which exhibits all of the properties of secure, self-sufficient, determined resolution, while he himself is feeling insecure and uncertain.

This is not to suggest that a composer never "feels". He does indeed "feel" throughout all his daily life but the feelings he expresses in his music are not real-life feelings, i.e. feelings of the sort he experiences every day. Rather, they are abstracted versions of feelings, i.e. imagined feelings, feelings imagined on the basis of real-life experience,⁷⁰ remembered feelings, Wordsworth's "emotion recollected in tranquility".

Because the composer deals with abstracted versions of feeling, he is capable of being objective about them in a way that would be impossible in real life. Moreover, while real-life feelings being attached to particular situations which may be unchangable, tend to be difficult to handle,

music, the medium capable of exhibiting all the properties of those feelings, may be manipulated, modified, fashioned into whatever form the composer wishes. Thus, not only does the composer deal with a more objective form of human feeling (the "imagined" form), he expresses those abstracted versions of feeling in a symbolic form -- music, which, while it exhibits all the properties of real-life feeling, nevertheless is manipulatable in a way that real feeling is not and probably could never be. Because of this, the composer is able to both explore and express his imagined feelings in a way which will enable him to achieve a far greater "understanding" of them.

This greater understanding also extends to those who "experience", i.e. listen to, the musical composition. Because the import of the musical work -- human feeling -- is perceived as being in the work, i.e. cannot be grasped apart from the musical form that presents it, when we listen in a concentrated fashion to the musical structures, we notice that they bear a remarkable resemblance to the forms of human feeling. In other words, we perceive the congruence (similar properties) between the musical composition and the forms of feeling. Now, these "properties" of feeling are not specifically developed by any one person, they are known and recognized by us all. Thus, when we focus on the musical structures of a musical work, we do not perceive a musical formulation of the composition and the forms of feeling. Now, these

"properties" of feeling are not specifically developed by any one person, they are known and recognized by us all. Thus, when we focus on the musical structures of a musical work, we do not perceive a musical formulation of the composer's own life or feeling. Rather we perceive the music as exhibiting properties of feeling which we all know and understand. Like the composer, we too bring our own knowledge of feeling to bear on the analogous musical structures, i.e. we relate to them in a personal way or "bestow on them our own soul and its moods"⁷¹ and thus the music composition, i.e. the single yet diverse form of it presents the life of feeling for our contemplation, recognition and understanding. As Davies states it:⁷²

The listener who feels a response which mirrors the emotion-characteristics presented in the music experiences an emotion which is uncluttered by the motives, desires, and the need to act on his feeling which accompany the more usual occurrences of that emotion. He can reflect on his feelings of say, sadness in a way that he could not normally do. Because his emotion is divorced from the sort of contexts in which it usually occurs he may come to a new understanding of it.

Here, again, it must be pointed out that the emotional response is both evoked by and concentrated in the emotion characteristics, i.e. the emotional "look" of the musical structures. Were these used as merely a catalyst or starting point by means of which the listener could get in touch with his own "actual" feelings, i.e. feelings which relate to specific personal situations, it is unlikely that he could continue to focus on the music. Rather, he would

begin to focus on personal concerns.

Recognizing this, Langer asserts that, in order to perceive the congruence between the structural forms of the music and the analogous forms of feeling, the spectators must be totally concentrated, not distracted by any external activity.⁷³ But, when we focus our attention to the exclusion of everything else on the "sheer appearance"⁷⁴ of the musical structures, the import which as we have seen inheres in the total form and so in every single element strikes us with such an immediacy and strength, that the musical structures seem to come alive, to "be" as it were "human feeling". As Langer states it:

The congruence is so striking that symbol and meaning appear as one reality.⁷⁵

Or, as Rader expresses it:

Resemblance is not reference, and in the moment of aesthetic vision, any sense of reference is superseded by the immediate reality of the aesthetic apparition.⁷⁶

The important word here is "apparition" which as it's normally used, implies an unusual or unexpected appearance; moreover, through being associated with religion, it even implies a supernatural quasi mystical appearance. How is it used in connection with Langer's theory? She herself uses it in connection with artistic form which she describes as "not an abstracted structure but an "apparition"."⁷⁷ What does she mean by this? Here, she is referring to the capacity of art symbols to directly present, note, not to point towards, the inner life of feeling. In other words

symbol and import appear as one reality -- as Carroll C. Pratt remarked: "Music sounds the way emotions feel",⁷⁸ i.e. the perceived congruence between the tonal structures of the music and the forms of feeling is so striking, so intense that one (the former) seems to become or "be" the other (the latter). The unusual nature of this perception, i.e. we know we are dealing with mere musical patterns, yet they seem to relate to and express with astonishing accuracy our inner life of feeling -- merits the use of the term "apparition". Here, music presents the appearance of feeling with that vividness and strength that we normally associate with the term. In a certain sense, even the mystical connotations of the word are appropriate, for music's capacity to mirror our emotional lives can, at times, be almost uncanny in its apparent accuracy.

As Langer's theory of art is extremely complex, it may be useful to briefly summarize it before we suggest any connections with the theory of *Einfühlung*.

A "work of art" (i.e. a musical composition), is a "form" (i.e. a single indivisible whole made up of a complex variety of parts all of which are connected both to each other and to the overall whole wherein they are all incorporated); "created" in such a way (i.e. put together in the way or form described above); as to "symbolize" (i.e. present objectively for contemplation, recognition and understanding); human feeling (the direct feeling of everything that can be felt including complex emotions). This "presentation" of human feeling is made possible by a congruence (a similarity of properties) between the structural patterns of music and the forms of human feeling; however, because the music composition as a single "whole" is made up of a complex variety of parts each of which are congruent with the forms of human feeling,

the overall congruence between composition and human feeling is so striking as to cancel any sense of reference; instead, symbol (the composition) and "import" (i.e. meaning -- human feeling) appear as one reality.

As to how Langer's work may be connected to Einfuhlung theory and thence to musical performance:

- 1) Langer's concept of "Feeling" is certainly broad enough to embrace Einfuhlung's concept of "the soul and its moods", "mental/emotional life" or "our modes of dynamic experience". Thus, both Langer's theory and Einfuhlung suggest that there may be a connection made between art-works and feeling (in Langer's broad sense).
- 2) Langer's notion of form may be connected to that second characteristic suggested by Lipps and Vokelt,⁷⁹ i.e. a unity amidst variety where the separate parts retain their individuality while at the same time exhibiting their relationship to each other and to the whole to which they all belong. Here, Langer's notion of a single though complex "whole" constitutes Lipps' and Vokelt's notion of "unity amidst variety". Moreover, as we shall see in the next chapter, Langer also suggests the importance of "organic form". This, however, will not be considered here.
- 3) Langer's notion of art works "symbolizing" human feeling by means of the analogous tonal structures of music, may be related to Lipps' and Vokelt's unity of form and content.⁸⁰ Here "content" refers to Langer's notion of subjective experience; "form" to the musical structures which exhibit the "look" of feeling. Because each of those structures is

created in relation to an overall "whole", the music composition as a whole exhibits the appearance of human feeling. In other words, the dynamic structure of the content (i.e. human feeling) resembles sufficiently the formal structure of the art-work (the musical structures of the composition), so that the content may be easily recognizable within it, i.e. the music composition may be seen as somehow expressive of human feeling. Thus, performers may perceive a musical composition as being capable of expressing human feeling.

4) In both Langer's notion of aesthetic experience and *Einfühlung*, a quality of selflessness emerges;⁸¹ (i.e. attention is not directed towards the self, it is directed towards the object -- the music composition -- and absorbed therein). Thus, Langer speaks of the spectator being undistracted by personal concerns and concentrating instead on the appearance of the musical composition. In the same way it was suggested in chapter one⁸² that the performer must be "selfless" with regard to the emotion expressed, i.e. it must pertain to the musical composition, not to his own personal concerns.

5) Langer's notion of art works formulating human feeling for our cognition may be related to Vokelt's notion of a work of art revealing through its content, a definitive human value capable of expanding man's consciousness from his own personal concerns to those of humanity as a whole.⁸³ Because the musical structures evoke an emotional response which is

to a large degree selfless and objective, we are enabled to reflect upon our feelings in a way that would be impossible in real life. More important even than that, the forms of feeling exhibited in musical structures do not relate to any one of us exclusively, they may be related to by anyone capable of listening to the music, no less privately and no less personally. Thus, the greater understanding of feeling one achieves through musical compositions is not limited to one's personal experience, rather it extends way beyond that to a greater concept of "feeling" as it was experienced far into the past and as it will be experienced far into the future. It is to this notion -- this ideal -- to which Donington was referring when he stated (speaking about musical performance):

there is a delight in responding to emotions
older and bigger than our short life spans
and more enduring.⁸⁴

Langer's notion of music compositions presenting feeling objectively for recognition and understanding helps to explain how Donington's ideal may be achieved.

6) One of the most problematic aspects of Einfühlung concerns its claim that during the aesthetic experience all sense of duality disappears, i.e. the mind unconsciously supposes itself at one with the object.⁸⁵ Both Lipps and Vokelt posited this as a very deep process occurring in the subconscious regions of the mind, an explanation which is hardly helpful in determining exactly how Einfühlung can occur. Langer, on the other hand, in suggesting that art

works directly present the life of feeling within artistic forms designed in such a way that their import strikes us with sufficient vividness and strength to merit the term "vision" or "apparition", offers an initial insight into this problematic but crucial aspect of Einfuhlung theory. Here, music sounds the way emotions feel, i.e. one is or becomes the other; on listening to a musical composition, we immediately perceive it as expressive of what we know of the inner life of feeling; the music seems to become us; we, in turn, live as it were within the music. This sudden and unusual appearance of the life of feeling within the tonal structures of music, Langer calls an "apparition"; an apparition which, it is our contention, in effect describes what Lipps and Vokelt called an act of Einfuhlung.

Footnotes

¹ Susanne K. Langer, Philosophy in a New Key (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1942).

² _____, Feeling and Form (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1933).

³ _____, Problems of Art (New York: Scribner's, 1957).

⁴ _____, Philosophical Sketches (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1962).

⁵ _____, Mind: An Essay on Human Feeling (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1967), Vol. 1, Chap. 7.

⁶ George Dickie, Aesthetics: An Introduction (Indianapolis: Pegasus/Bobbs Merrill Company Inc., 1971), p. 78.

⁷ Morris Weitz, "The Role of Theory in Aesthetics," The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Volume 15 (1956).

⁸ George Dickie and R.J. Sclafani (editors), Aesthetics: A Critical Anthology (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1977), p. 1-3. It should be pointed out here that philosophers who attempt thus to capture the essence of art are working within an "essentialist" framework; i.e. they believe that a definition of art can be given in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions. As has already been mentioned, however, Morris Weitz has brought into question the notion of art being thus definable. (See p. 72, chapter 3 of this thesis.)

⁹ Susanne K. Langer, Feeling and Form, op. cit., p. 40.

¹⁰ Monroe Beardsley, Aesthetics (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1958), pp. 528-530. Again, it should be pointed out here that philosophers who seek thus to capture the essence of "Aesthetic Experience" are also working within an "essentialist" framework; i.e. they believe that a distinctive kind of experience called "aesthetic" can be isolated and described, and that its "essence" can be formulated within a theory or definition. Others have explicitly argued, however, that many of the central notions of the "aesthetic experience" theory are untenable. For example see: Joseph Margolis, "Aesthetic Perception," The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism (1960), pp. 209-213, reprinted in Margolis, The Language of Art and Art Criticism (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1965),

pp. 23-33; and George Dickie, "The Myth of the Aesthetic Attitude," American Philosophical Quarterly (1964), pp. 56-65, reprinted in John Hospers, ed. Introductory Readings in Aesthetics (New York: Free Press, 1969), pp. 28-44.

¹¹Susanne K. Langer, Problems of Art in Melvin Rader, A Modern Book of Aesthetics, fourth edition (New York: Holt Rinehart and Winston Inc. 1973), p. 296.

¹²See George Dickie, Aesthetics: An Introduction, op. cit., p. 45.

¹³See especially, Ernest Nagel's review of Philosophy in a New Key, Journal of Philosophy, 1943, pp. 323-29.

¹⁴Melvin Rader, A Modern Book of Aesthetics, op. cit., chapt. 9, pp. 281-282.

¹⁵Ibid., p. 282.

¹⁶Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962).

¹⁷Nelson Goodman, Languages of Art (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1968).

Also Lawrence Foss, "Art as Cognitive: Beyond Scientific Realism," Philosophy of Science 38 1971.

¹⁸Susanne K. Langer, Problems of Art in Melvin Rader, Modern Aesthetics, op. cit., p. 291.

¹⁹_____, Feeling and Form, op. cit., p. 32.

²⁰_____, Problems of Art in Melvin Rader, Modern Aesthetics, op. cit., p. 296.

²¹I am indebted to Eamonn Callan for this notion.

²²See Melvin Rader, A Modern Book of Aesthetics, op. cit., p. 281.

²³Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (New York: Macmillan, 1953).

²⁴Susanne K. Langer, Feeling and Form, op. cit., p. 40.

²⁵_____, Problems of Art in Melvin Rader, Modern Aesthetics, op. cit., p. 286.

²⁶Ibid., p. 299.

²⁷For future reference notice that Langer includes complex emotions within her definition of feeling.

²⁸ Susanne K. Langer, Problems of Art in Melvin Rader, Modern Aesthetics, op. cit., p. 287.

²⁹ Ibid., p. 287.

³⁰ Ibid., p. 287.

³¹ A quotation from L.B. Meyer's, Explaining Music (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1973) may be useful here:

To understand the world, we must abstract from the ineffable uniqueness of stimuli by selecting and grouping, classifying and analyzing A meaningful, a humanly viable world must be ordered and patterned into relationships of some sort." ... The order thus discerned -- whether in nature, culture or art -- is not however arbitrary or fictitious. The process and forms, patterns and principles ... are derived, directly or indirectly, from existent events that are really "there" in the world. pp. 3-4

³² Susanne K. Langer, Problems of Art in Melvin Rader, Modern Aesthetics, op. cit., p. 287.

³³ See chapter two, p. 60.

³⁴ Ernest Nagel, "Symbolism and Science" quoted in Langer, Problems of Art in Melvin Rader, Modern Aesthetics, op. cit., p. 295.

³⁵ Ibid., p. 295.

³⁶ Ibid., p. 296.

³⁷ Ibid., p. 296.

³⁸ The use of the word "articulate" is significant here. The transitive form of the verb "articulate" means: to divide (vocal sound) into distinct and significant parts. To pronounce distinctly, express in words, to utter (Oxford Dictionary). As Langer uses it here, the key explanatory term is "distinct". To pronounce distinctly is to give clear and effective utterance to a group of sounds. To "articulate" an idea is to give it clear and effective utterance; i.e. to make absolutely clear and comprehensible the full and meaningful nature of what is being expressed.

³⁹ Paul H. Hirst, "Language and Thought" in Knowledge and the Curriculum (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1974), p. 71.

⁴⁰Susanne K. Langer, Problems of Art in Melvin Rader, Modern Aesthetics, op. cit., p. 296.

⁴¹Ibid., p. 296.

⁴²See P.81 of this thesis.

⁴³Susanne K. Langer, Problems of Art in Melvin Rader, Modern Aesthetics, op. cit., p. 290.

⁴⁴Ibid., p. 290.

⁴⁵Ibid., p. 290.

⁴⁶Here, it must be pointed out again that Langer includes "emotion" within her concept of "Feeling" (taken in its broadest sense). Thus, while art works such as music compositions may symbolize what cannot be expressed in words, they also symbolize those "emotions" for which we have language names.

⁴⁷See especially the song-cycles of Schubert which specifically deal with love, hate, anger, joy, despair, jealousy to name but a few. All of these emotional states are to some extent expressible in words.

⁴⁸Susanne K. Langer, Problems of Art in Melvin Rader, Modern Aesthetics, p. 293.

⁴⁹Melvin Rader, A Modern Book of Aesthetics, op. cit., p. 282.

⁵⁰Carroll C. Pratt, "Music as the Language of Emotions" quoted in Melvin Rader, A Modern Book of Aesthetics, op. cit., p. 282.

⁵¹Susanne K. Langer, Feeling and Form, op. cit., p. 27.

⁵²Ibid., p. 27.

⁵³George Dickie, Aesthetics: An Introduction, p. 79.

⁵⁴Langer's insistence that the art symbol's function is not signification rules out the notion that the art symbol is in fact an iconic symbol. For, in fact, an iconic symbol as it is normally used resembles that which it signifies. Moreover, this signification is established not by resemblance alone but also by convention -- the highway crossroads sign for example. Langer's iconic art symbol seems to lack the necessary conventional aspect.

⁵⁵ Here, we begin to see a connection with Langer's earlier definition of Form (p. 82 of this thesis). An art symbol because it is single exhibits the form of a "whole resulting from the relation of mutually dependent factors" -- it exhibits that meaning of form Langer cited earlier in her definition of form.

⁵⁶ For example: the sentence "she hurried" to the bus stop is not significantly changed if we substitute "walked quickly" for "hurried".

⁵⁷ Susanne K. Langer, Problems of Art in Melvin Rader, Modern Aesthetics, op. cit., p. 297.

⁵⁸ Ibid., p. 294.

⁵⁹ Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, Section II, op. cit.

⁶⁰ See p. 87 of this thesis.

⁶¹ Susanne K. Langer, Problems of Art in Melvin Rader, Modern Aesthetics, op. cit., p. 292.

⁶² Ibid., p. 291.

⁶³ Susanne K. Langer, Feeling and Form, op. cit., p. 27.

⁶⁴ See p. 90, this thesis.

⁶⁵ See p. 90, this thesis.

⁶⁶ For a more thorough explication of the "properties" theory see John Hospers, "The Concept of Aesthetic Expression," Proc. of the Aristotelian Society (1954-55), p. 313-344.

A similar notion is put forward by S. Davies in "The Expression of Emotion in Music," in Mind No. 353 (January 1980) who refers, however not to properties but to "emotion characteristics of appearances," i.e. the "look" of something.

⁶⁷ See p. 88, this thesis.

⁶⁸ Or, as S. Davies puts it, "an emotion characteristic in appearance is "worn" by, say, a face; it is not expressed by the face, nor does it express a feeling ... a person need not look the way that he feels." "The Expression of Emotion in Music" in Mind, op. cit., p. 69-70.

⁶⁹ See footnote 68 above.

⁷⁰Langer suggests in connection with this that the composer expresses "not his own actual feelings but what he knows about feeling." Problems of Art, in Melvin Rader, Modern Aesthetics, op. cit., p. 292.

⁷¹See chapter 2, p.41 of this thesis.

⁷²S. Davies, "The Expression of Emotion in Music," in Mind, op. cit., p. 86.

⁷³Susanne K. Langer, Feeling and Form, op. cit., p. 59.

⁷⁴Ibid., p. 47.

⁷⁵Susanne K. Langer, Problems of Art in Melvin Rader, Modern Aesthetics, op. cit., p. 292.

⁷⁶Melvin Rader, A Modern Book of Aesthetics, op. cit., p. 282.

⁷⁷Susanne K. Langer, Problems of Art in Melvin Rader, Modern Aesthetics, op. cit., p. 292.

⁷⁸Carroll C. Pratt, "Design of Music" in Journal of Aesthetic and Art Criticism Vol. 12 (1954) p. 296.

Also see S. Davies, "The Expression of Emotion in Music" in Mind, op. cit., p. 86.

"Music conveys to us what an emotion-characteristic sounds like."

⁷⁹See chapter two, p.60 of this thesis.

⁸⁰See chapter two, p.60 of this thesis.

⁸¹See chapter three of this thesis, p.101 and chapter two, p.58 .

⁸²See chapter one, p.20 of this thesis.

⁸³See chapter two, p.61 of this thesis.

⁸⁴See chapter one, p.22 of this thesis.

⁸⁵ See chapter two, p.54.

IV. MUSIC COMPOSITIONS AS ORGANIC FORMS

In chapter three it was stated that a musical composition could be defined as:

a form created in such a way as to symbolize human feeling.¹

Also in chapter three, we mentioned as one of the most important characteristics of that form: that it be constructed as a single "whole" with the separate parts (i.e. the individual notes or phrases of the composition) retaining their individuality while at the same time exhibiting their relationship to each other and to the whole to which they all belong. Such a form is an "Organic form" and it appears in Einfuhlung theory as the second of the four characteristics that art-works (for example, music compositions) should exhibit in order to facilitate an act of Einfuhlung.²

Since it is our contention that musical performance may be explained in terms of Einfuhlung, it follows that the notion of organic form is important and relevant to the concept of performance being investigated in this thesis. For, following Lipps' and Vokelt's suggestion, in order to facilitate or promote an act of Einfuhlung on the performer's part, the music composition should exhibit the characteristics of organic form.

Moreover, also in chapter three,³ we mentioned that it is the capacity of art works to manifest their import

(i.e. meaning) in forms which exhibit the characteristics of complex wholes resulting from the relation of mutually independent parts, (i.e. organic forms), which gives rise to that sense of "vision" or "apparition" whereby symbol (i.e. the music composition), and import (i.e. human feeling) appear as one reality. In the same way, to state it in musical performance terms, it is the capacity of music compositions to manifest their import (i.e. human feeling) in organic forms which enables the performer to "live" the music, i.e. to perceive it as so expressive of human life and feeling, that he cannot help but throw himself heart and soul as it were, into the act of playing.⁴

Since organic form is important to the whole notion of *Einfühlung* and, from there we may infer to the concept of performance presented in this thesis, here, in chapter four, it is intended that we focus on organic form, i.e. the creation or making of such forms.⁵ In dealing with this aspect, the theories of two writers will be considered:

- 1) Susanne K. Langer whose book Feeling and Form⁶ includes an extensive treatment of the creating of a musical composition and whose treatment of the creative process makes explicit mention of organic form;
- 2) Leonard B. Meyer whose books Emotion and Meaning in Music⁷ and Music, the Arts and Ideas⁸ develop in a more detailed fashion, what could be construed as some of the key notions of organic form.

Let us first consider Susanne K. Langer's notion of the making of a musical composition.

Langer conceives a musical composition as growing from the first imagination of its general movement to its complete, physical presentation, its occurrence, i.e. its performance.⁹ Because here, in chapter four, we are primarily concerned with the creation of the musical work, i.e. the composer's role in the fashioning of the composition, we will confine our investigations to Langer's account of the composer's creative process.

In dealing with the creation of musical works, Langer makes constant reference to "organic" form,¹⁰ a reference whose explanatory usefulness is somewhat limited by the fact that she never actually defines it. Since much of her account of musical creativity, however, may be intrinsically connected to organic form and since it is specifically referred to by Lipps and Vokelt, it may be useful to ask here: what is organic form? and what are its essential attributes?

The term "organic form" usually refers to the growth systems of living organisms, e.g. plants.¹¹ It has been defined primarily by five attributes:¹²

- 1) the origin of the whole precedes the differentiation of the parts; the whole is primary. The parts are derived.¹³
- 2) an organic form conveys the process of its own development to the observer;¹⁴
- 3) as it develops it assimilates diverse elements into its own substance;¹⁵


- 4) Permanence of form is a living process always being achieved and directed from within; it exists by a cumulative process of sequential expected changes.¹⁶
- 5) the parts of the living whole are interdependent, no part can be removed without damaging the remaining parts.¹⁷

Let us consider each of these attributes in relation to Langer's account of the making of a music composition.

The first attribute of organic form may be related to Langer's notion of "embryonic form"¹⁸ which she posited as the first stage of composition and described it as the process of conception which takes place entirely within the composer's mind and issues in a more or less sudden recognition of the total form to be achieved. This constitutes what is commonly termed "inspiration"¹⁹ i.e. the insight which forms as it were the embryo of the work, the germ of the composition which the composer will develop. Langer aptly terms it (thereby implying another connection with organic form, i.e. with the second attribute of organic form) the "commanding" form.²⁰

In other words, before he sets about writing up the individual parts of a work, the composer has already an idea or intuition of the total form or "gestalt"²¹ of the work. And, under the influence of this total idea, he composes every part of his piece. Thus, there is no part or element which escapes the influence of this "embryonic" form. Parts, in other words, are not composed arbitrarily, i.e. the composer does not wander irresponsibly from theme to theme, key to key or mood to mood, suddenly, and for

apparently no reason, selecting one that appeals to him. Instead, they always reflect the greater whole which emerges first in a flash of insight or intuition.

What is the nature of the "whole" thus recognized? i.e. what characteristic form or shape does it take? Here, Ms. Langer speaks somewhat vaguely of "a fundamental movement of melody or harmonic progression" and terms it the "musical matrix".²² Her vagueness is understandable here, for just as every composition is an individual work, so too its matrix figure is highly individual and, given the number of musical compositions available, it is extremely difficult to come up with a generalized idea of what constitutes a "matrix" figure. However, in order to clarify the notion of "matrix" let us look at a few examples. Melody, rhythm and harmony constitute three very important elements in musical compositions and a matrix figure may focus attention on a particular aspect of any one of these elements (or perhaps a combination of all of them). So, in the slow movement of Beethoven's Seventh Symphony, a characteristic rhythmic figure  functions as musical matrix, i.e. the entire movement is fashioned out of the possible implications of that simple rhythmic figure; in Beethoven's sonata op. 110, the melodic content of all four movements may be traced back to the melodic outline of the opening phrase of the composition; finally in Beethoven's piano sonata op. 111, a single harmonic progression (an unresolved diminished seventh) constitutes

the matrix, i.e. the entire first movement is built on the implications of that fundamental progression. Since this "matrix" emerges first, we may reasonably assert that, as in organic form, the "origin of the whole precedes the differentiation of the parts."²³

The second attribute of organic form relates to Langer's notion of "commanding" form. The matrix figure, as we have seen, is born of the composer's thought and feeling, but as soon as he recognizes it and sets forth its outline, it takes on the form of an impersonal idea and opens to him a deep mine of musical resources. It "commands" as it were its own development,²⁴ i.e. the matrix as it occurs to the composer, already suggests its own method or way of composition. It contains implicit within it all the tendencies of the piece -- the need for dissonance and consonance, novelty and reiteration, length of phrase and timing of cadences. It may imply such things as ornamentation, or intensification, or greater simplification. Putting it most succinctly, it sets specific problems for the composer to solve, i.e. it implies a number of possible developments and demands that any solutions he comes up with, i.e. whichever developments he chooses, spring not capriciously from his own powers of solution but from the matrix form he has already created. In other words, as in organic form, the matrix or fundamental concept of the "whole" conveys or implies the process of its own development to the composer.

The third attribute of organic form suggests that as it develops, the organism assimilates diverse elements into its own substance. Coleridge offers as example, here, the living organism of the mind.

Events and images, the lively and spirit-stirring machinery of the external world, are like light, and air, and moisture to the seed of the Mind, which would else rot and perish. In all processes of mental evolution the object of the senses must stimulate the mind; and the Mind must in turn assimilate and digest the food which it thus receives from without.²⁵

How does this relate to the musical composition? The "matrix" is something like the mind in Coleridge's example. As itself, i.e. the bare fundamental idea, it does not constitute a musical composition. Rather, in order to become one, it needs development. Now, development, of its very nature involves new or different ideas. Thus, this aspect of organic form relates to the composer's selection of new aspects of development. The matrix or embryonic form implies or indicates a multitude of possible continuations (i.e. developments) but, even more important, it guides the composer's judgement as he selects those he considers most appropriate. Thus, in selecting a particular mode of development, the composer makes the selection not just by considering the actual mode of development in itself, he also considers other later developments made viable by the selection of this particular one and, most important, considers all the possible implications derived thereof in relation to his initial concept of the work as a

whole. In other words, he views every option available in relation to other options and to the work as a whole.

What effect does this complex process of development selection have on the musical composition? It enables the matrix to assimilate and transfigure all the new ideas selected so that as the composition progresses it exhibits itself more and more as an integrated though apparently varied whole. In other words, the matrix, like a living organism

maintains its identity and in the face of influences ... [new development figures] ... that should mould it into something functionally different, it seems to preserve its original purposes and becomes distorted from its true lines rather than simply replaced by something else.²⁶

Or, as organic form suggests, "as it (i.e. the organism or musical composition) develops, (or is developed), it assimilates diverse elements (new musical ideas) into its own substance (its initial concept of the whole)."

The final permanent form which the composition achieves is directed entirely from within, i.e. is derived entirely from the implications of the matrix. It exists by a cumulative process of sequential expected changes, i.e. the matrix implies certain modes of development, but, each one selected sets up its own chain of implied modes of development, and whichever one of those is selected, it too sets up more implications and so on and on. In other words, the entire composition may be seen as a cumulative process of implied, so expected, modes of development. Now, Langer

defines the essence of rhythm "as the preparation of a new event by the ending of a previous one."²⁷ In other words, a particular mode of development as it completes itself implies, i.e. prepares the way for, causes us to expect, the next "new" mode of development. This "new" mode, in turn prepares the way for the next and so forth. We see this principle exemplified in nature where the existent form of the organism manifests itself to the observer as the end product of a sequence of development whose course may be inferred from rings of growth or layers of deposited shell.²⁸ "Growth" is the first power of living things and it takes place in a sequential series of expected so prepared for, i.e. rhythmic changes. Thus, Langer proposes that the underlying principle which forms the basis of organic unity is "rhythmic continuity".²⁹

Relating all of this to music would indicate the following: a musical phrase or group of notes implies, i.e. causes us to expect that a specific kind of next phrase will follow. But, this new phrase prepares the way for, i.e. implies yet another new one and so it continues. This constant preparation of a new event by the ending of a previous one, Langer calls "rhythmic continuity" and she perceives it as the basis of that "organic unity" we see exemplified in living organisms and in music compositions.

Do music compositions really develop in this way? As we shall see later in this chapter, Leonard B. Meyer would argue that indeed this is exactly how they develop.

Accordingly we will forego a more thorough investigation of this notion until later.

Finally, in relation to the fifth attribute of organic form. A music composition, being made up of a cumulative sequence of implied, thus expected, modes of development, all of whom must relate not only to each other but to the work as a whole, manifests a highly complex unity. Within the unified work of art, everything that is necessary is there, and nothing that is not necessary is there. Because all the parts are necessary, no part can be removed without damaging the remaining parts.

At this point, it may be asked: 1) is Langer correct, i.e. do music compositions exhibit the characteristics of organic form?

Here, one would have to answer that certainly many compositions do exhibit the characteristics mentioned above, e.g. Beethoven's last quartets.³⁰ However, the shift in emphasis which characterized much of the music of the twentieth century produced new concepts of form which moved away from the Romantic notion of "Organic Form". Thus, Langer's concept of creativity might not satisfactorily explain the creative processes which have given us the new styles of the twentieth century.

2) Is the notion of a "commanding" embryonic form correct? Are there matrix figures in musical compositions?

Most composers would probably agree with the notion of their work consisting of a kind of sophisticated "problem-solving". Indeed, Stravinsky specifically speaks of it in those terms.³¹ Whether or not they would agree with the notion of a matrix figure, however, is more debatable, all the more so since organic form plays little part in the creation of twentieth century music. On the other hand, Reti's thematic analysis³² might possibly be connected to Langer's notion of musical matrix. However, we can do no more here than cite that possibility.

3) Do musical compositions as they develop assimilate diverse elements in their own substance?

Again, some striking examples may be found in music compositions written between 1700 and 1900. For example, Beethoven's Diabelli variations introduced the notion of metamorphosis, a notion which appears in much of the music of Franz Liszt whose "transformation of themes" is well documented.

Assuming that Langer is correct and musical compositions do exhibit all of the characteristics of organic form, why is this important?

It is important for two main reasons:

1) In formulating the list of characteristics which a work of art should exhibit in order to facilitate an act of *Einfühlung*, Lipps and Volkelt mentioned as their third characteristic,³³ that an art work should exhibit unity through the dominance of a certain aspect or quality. Now, Langer's notion of the "musical matrix" may be connected to

this. Here, a fundamental movement of melody or harmonic progression dominates the entire composition, i.e. it implies or contains within it all the tendencies of the piece and "commands", as it were, its own development. Thus even the smallest detail can be seen as related in some way to the overall whole or idea. Moreover, the fact that all of the parts are necessary means that every detail can be seen as functional in the articulation of the overall "whole".

2) Organic form is also important because here, Langer offers yet another valuable insight into that problematic aspect of *Einfühlung*³⁴ where subject and object become as one, i.e. where all dualism disappears and the music seems to "become" us; where we "live", as it were, the musical structures.

The essence of all music composition, Langer asserts, is the semblance of organic movement, i.e. the "illusion" or appearance it exhibits of an indivisible whole.³⁵ In other words, the achieved form of a musical composition resembles closely, "mirrors" even, the growth processes of living organisms. Now, human beings constitute the most highly developed species of living organisms. Thus, "vital organization,"³⁶ i.e. organic unity is or constitutes the "frame" of all our feelings for feelings exist only in living organisms. So, a musical composition which manifests organic form achieves two objectives: 1) it gives the appearance of "life" to the tonal structures which symbolize subjective existence. It provides the same frame, i.e.

organic unity for those musical structures that we, as living organisms, provide for our everyday forms of feeling;

2) A succession of emotions that have no reference to each other do not constitute an "emotional life" any more than a discontinuous and independent functioning of organs collected under one skin would be a physical "life". The great office of music, Langer asserts:

is to organize our conception of feeling into more than an occasional awareness of emotional storm, i.e. to give us an insight into what may truly be called the "life of feeling" or subjective unity of experience.³⁷

Thus, to sum up: according to Einfühlung theory, the making of a musical composition should adhere to the principles of "organic form". Where this occurs a musical work is a single organic composition whose "import" is its "life" which as it is presented in a single organic form, like actual life appears as an indivisible phenomenon. Because it is presented in "organic form", the "import" of a piece of music, i.e. the presentation of the inner-life of feelings, appears to have "life", i.e. the musical structures appear "alive", appear to exhibit real actual feeling. In turn, because they appear thus "alive", the performer in an act of Einfühlung, is enabled to project into them his own mental life. But, when his inner emotional activities are fused with the external sensuous form of the object (the music work), a form which itself exhibits the appearance of many of the characteristics of "life" (i.e. the appearance of feeling and the appearance of

organic unity), his mind unconsciously supposes itself at one with the object and there is no longer any duality -- an act of *Einfühlung* occurs.

Having considered the principles of organic form in general, we must now focus specifically on the principles of "growth"³⁸ and "internality"³⁹ both of which have important ramifications for the next theory we wish to consider.

In this chapter, we have considered organic form as it is specifically exhibited in plant life, and have attempted to use the insights gained thereof in order to explicate Langer's notion of the creation of a musical composition. While we will continue to consider the growth systems of plants, in our exploration of the principles of "growth" and "internality" we will also consider our own growth processes, more specifically our own assimilation of experience. Since human beings constitute living organisms the additional focus on our own assimilation of experience is entirely relevant. However, this aspect is included here for two reasons: 1) it focuses attention on our own experience of growth, experience which is both relevant and important to our exploration of L.B. Meyer's theory of music. 2) it may help to explicate the complex growth systems of plants and so indirectly increase our understanding of organic form.

Before considering L.B. Meyer's theory of music, we must first carefully examine the principles of growth and internality.

The principle of internality³⁹ states that the final permanent form which the plant or living organism achieves is directed entirely from within; i.e. the plant is the spontaneous source of its own energy, it is not shaped from without. In other words the form that we see now exhibited in a plant was not put together, made, or even maintained by some external source. Rather, the form that we see now exhibited in the plant exists as the end product of a sequence of development whose course was implied even in the very first embryonic stages of life.⁴⁰ In the same way, the physique and mental process of the adult person was not made in its present form from without. Rather, it exists as the end product of a sequence of development whose course was already implied even in the initial stages of the life of the foetus.

Now, in achieving its present form of existence, i.e. in reaching its present stage of growth, an organism, e.g. a plant has assimilated elements of its external surroundings to itself.⁴¹ This assimilation of factors not originally belonging to the organism whereby they enter into its life, is the principle of "growth". Normally, we tend to associate the concept of growth with things becoming bigger.⁴² But, a "growing" thing need not actually become bigger. Instead, since the metabolic action of organisms such as plants does not stop when a non-living substance has been assimilated and become alive but is in a continuous process of oxidation;⁴³ i.e. since the plant never stops

assimilating new elements but is always in the process of doing so; at a certain stage some elements, i.e. elements which were assimilated previously, resign from the organic patterns, i.e. they no longer function or take part in the organic process; they break down into organic structures; i.e. they die, and so cease to be part of the plant as it is at the present moment. When growth, (i.e. the process of assimilation of new elements) is more vigorous, (i.e. stronger) than decay, (i.e. the process of resignation of old elements) the living form grows larger (i.e. it exhibits a perceivable change in size); when they are balanced, it is self-perpetuating, (i.e. the living form stays as it is); when decay occurs faster than growth the organism is decadent (i.e. the living form begins to wilt or show signs of decay). At a certain point the metabolic process stops all at once and life is finished.⁴⁴

In much the same way, in achieving our present state of existence, i.e. in reaching the stage of adulthood, for example, we have assimilated, i.e. learnt from, been influenced by, elements of our childhood experiences, experiences, which of their very nature involved elements external to ourselves. However, since we are constantly in the process of having experiences, all of which have the potentiality of influencing us to a greater or lesser extent, our conscious minds do not, indeed, cannot retain every aspect of the experiences we encounter. Instead, some of them, as it were, resign from our conscious minds,

i.e. we forget them; more of them we carry forward with us into adult life, i.e. we remember them. Now, if we ask why it is that we remember certain aspects of our childhood experiences and not others, on reflection, our answer would probably suggest that we remember those aspects of childhood which struck us as being important or significant in some way. Moreover, were we to reflect further, we would probably find that it is those very "remembered" aspects which exerted the most noticeable influence on us as people. Putting it another way, we could probably point to those experiences and say with conviction that they "changed" our lives. In other words, in people as well as in plants the assimilation of new experiences tends to promote "change" within the living organism. Moreover, somewhat like plants, when people place themselves in situations which will inevitably make them encounter a large amount of new experiences, a perceivable change in attitude or disposition may occur; when they settle into a comfortable situation where all they do is repeat already familiar experiences, no perceivable change occurs and we speak of them as being in a "rut"; where a balance is maintained between new and familiar experiences, a slower, less radically perceivable rate of change may occur.

The point to be emphasized here is that in the phenomenon we call life, both continuous change and permanence, co-exist;⁴⁵ i.e. the plant at its mature stage of growth really does exhibit a permanent form but it is a

permanence that is constantly being achieved -- it is a permanence that exists really as "a pattern of changes".⁴⁶ In the same way, people retain their sense of identity⁴⁷ throughout the vast range of experiences they encounter every day of their lives. But, that sense of identity is an ever-changing one for in the process of living one is constantly having experiences, experiences which of their very nature must be assimilated and which so contain within them the potentiality of effecting change in the organism.

But the manner in which we assimilate new experiences is determined to a great extent not only by our own inherent natures but also by the nature of our previous experiences. For example: given a situation where a person's previous encounters with "love" have, in the final analysis caused them intense anguish and pain, such a person faced with a new situation involving "love", will probably react very defensively, may even forego the new experience altogether (with all its inherent potentiality for change). Moreover, were someone to know that person really well, and were they to be aware of his past experiences, they could probably describe his reaction as being somewhat predictable. Thus we often say of someone: "Given the type of person they are and their experiences of such and such it is not surprising that they reacted in such a manner." It should be pointed out here that in cases such as these we base our predictions upon: (a) our knowledge of the person himself, i.e. his disposition, attitudes, etc.; and (b) our awareness of

specific experiences encountered by him -- experiences deemed relevant or important within the particular context being considered. Now, the personalities of all adults contain implicit within them aspects of past experiences, important and unimportant, which, united with their inherent natures creates a complicated mass of attitudes, habits and tendencies which determine to a large extent the manner in which new experiences will be assimilated. Were one to be fully aware of all of these factors, one could probably predict with a high degree of accuracy, how one would react to and thus assimilate new experiences. However, because our awareness is limited to a relatively small number of significant factors, while we may suggest that such-and-such a reaction is more likely to occur than others, we tacitly acknowledge that some unforeseen reaction may in fact occur.⁴⁸ Nevertheless, the notion of predictability is intrinsically connected to that ever-evolving organism -- the human mind.

In much the same way:

the form [of a plant] is made and maintained by complicated disposition of mutual influences among the physical units (atoms, molecules, then cells, then organs) whereby change tends to occur in certain pre-eminent ways.⁴⁹

"Pre-eminent ways" here refers to dominant ways, ways that are more likely to occur than others and so in that sense are predictable.³⁰

So, (to turn full circle) instead of a simple law of transformation such as one finds in inorganic change,

living things, e.g. plants, but also human beings, exist by a cumulative process of changes⁵¹ but, one where the nature of the change forthcoming is already implied or prepared for, i.e. to an extent predictable, within the present state of the organism. Thus, a single instant in the life of any living organism will incorporate within itself: a fulfillment, i.e. an actual occurrence of what has already been implied or prepared for in past stages of growth together, i.e. co-existent with preparations or implications of what is yet to come.

This continuous pattern of not just arbitrary change but implied and so expected change, Langer calls "rhythmic continuity"⁵² and she poses it as the basis of that organic unity which in effect gives permanence to living bodies, a permanence that is not static but is in fact a constantly evolving pattern of changes. Because at any given time the form that the living organism exhibits exists both as the end product of that which was implied and now in turn, itself implies, living organisms exhibit an ongoing sense of unity, a "oneness" which we describe as "organic form".

How may the foregoing examination of "growth" and "internality" be related to musical compositions?

According to Leonard B. Meyer's theory of music,⁵³ i.e. Western tonal music of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, musical compositions exhibit continuous patterns of not just arbitrary change, but implied and so expected change. Thus, Meyer conceives that music activates

tendencies, i.e. expectations and provides meaningful and relevant resolutions.⁵⁴ Moreover, because Meyer construes music as hierarchic⁵⁵ -- tones combining to form motives, motives phrases, and so on -- Meyer suggests that this pattern of tendency-resolution applies to every aspect or detail of a musical work. For example, according to Meyer's theory, a single tone within the context of a particular musical motive, functions both as a fulfillment, i.e. an actual occurrence, of what has already been implied or prepared for by the immediately preceding tone or tones; and as an implication, i.e. an actual indicator, of tones yet to come.⁵⁶ This process of implication-resolution occurs hierarchically, i.e. just as a note implies the next note, so too at a higher structural level a phrase (as a whole) implies another phrase; an entire section implies another section; a movement possibly another movement and so on. In other words, a music composition exhibits an overall yet on-going sense of unity;⁵⁷ it exhibits Langer's notion of "rhythmic-continuity,"⁵⁸ a "oneness" of the type we suggested was characteristic of "organic form".

But, and this is important, Meyer also constructs a theory of emotion in music which is intrinsically connected to the notion of expectation-resolution. Thus, he conceives that music activates tendencies, inhibits them and provides meaningful and relevant resolutions. He uses the word "inhibit" in this connection because he accepts the theory of emotion which states that it is only when

there is an interval imposed between the arousal of a tendency or desire and its fulfillment, that emotion is aroused.⁵⁹ Now, according to Meyer, this is the way we encounter emotion in our day to day experiences. In other words in our everyday experiences,

emotion or affect is aroused when a tendency to respond is arrested or inhibited.⁶⁰

Thus, musical, because they too activate tendencies, inhibit them, and provide meaningful and relevant resolutions, awaken our emotions and with them the expectation of their fulfillment. They postpone, however, the resolutions of our expectations and so increase the tension. Eventually, all is made well, and the tension is dissipated by the eventual provision of an expected solution. To state it briefly, musical compositions set up "musical versions" as it were of situations which normally arouse our emotions. Thus, to relate this back to Einfuhlung theory: a musical composition is designed in such a way as to "mirror" our usual experience of emotion. Because they are so designed, they sufficiently resemble our own experience of emotion⁶¹ that we immediately project into them our own emotional life. In musical performance terms: the music composition that the performer plays is designed in such a way as to "mirror" his usual experience of emotion. Because it is so designed, it sufficiently resembles his emotional experience that the performer, recognizing this, projects into it or bestows upon it his own emotional life.

We must now examine the basic principles of Meyer's theory. Let us begin by examining his concept of emotion.

Meyer does not define emotion as such, regarding it as indescribable except in terms of the stimulus situations to which it is attached.⁶² He is thus more concerned with pinpointing situations which arouse emotion. Accordingly our definition reads:

Emotion or affect is aroused when a tendency to respond is arrested or inhibited.⁶³

Now, one's immediate reaction to this might argue that surely this represents a very limited mechanistic view of our immensely complex emotional lives. Thus, one could suggest that Langer's definition of feeling⁶⁴ represents a far more comprehensive notion of what is involved in our emotional experiences. Moreover, one could ask: is not this notion of emotion somewhat more limited than the notion of "mental life" which was mentioned in the theory of *Einfuhlung*?⁶⁵ While agreeing that the definition above is somewhat limited, certainly mechanistic, and providing of little insight into the complexities of our emotional experiences, nevertheless, one could argue that it is not as far removed from Langer's definition of feeling as might first appear. Here, one could refer to Langer's description of the subjective aspect of experience

the direct feeling of it -- what it is like to be waking and moving, to be drowsy - slowing down All such directly felt experiences usually have no names -- they are named, if at all, for the outward conditions that normally accompany their occurrence....⁶⁶

Now, in seeking to explain emotion in terms of the stimulus situation to which it is attached, Meyer is, in effect, focusing attention on what basically underlies those outward conditions that Langer mentions above. Thus, his theory focuses specifically on one aspect of her broader notion of feeling. As long as one recognizes the limitations involved, it cannot be put aside as of no importance.

Moreover, Meyer's definition of emotion, focusing as it does on situations which arouse emotion, while limited, is nonetheless relevant to Einfühlung's notion of mental life. For, surely we encounter emotions as an integral part of our day to day experiences. Thus, Meyer's theory, by focusing on the situations which arouse emotion can be said to provide an important insight into one way in which we develop our complex emotional lives.

Let us now look more carefully at Meyer's definition: according to Meyer: 1) a stimulus produces in the organism a tendency to think or act in a particular way; Meyer's example here is that of a habitual smoker who wants a cigarette.⁶⁷

2) nervous energy is aroused in connection with, in order to effect this tendency;⁶⁸ the smoker reaches into his pocket to find one.

3) if the tendency is satisfied without delay, then no emotion or affect is aroused; if the smoker finds a cigarette then there will be no affective response.⁶⁹

4) if the natural response pattern is delayed or blocked,

i.e. if the smoker doesn't find a cigarette, the built up energy may gain release through being channelled into a generalized motor reaction, i.e. the smoker may stamp his foot or make some other sort of gesture⁷⁰ or

5) if this motor response is also blocked or isn't enough to expend all the nervous energy, the built up energy remains pent up, inhibited, engendering an intense feeling of tension or suspense within the body ... an emotive feeling.⁷¹

6) This feeling of tension or state of suspense consists essentially of an awareness that an expected response has not occurred; i.e. the smoker hasn't found a cigarette. This causes feelings of doubt, confusion and uncertainty as one is forced to acknowledge that one doesn't know for certain what is going to happen next.⁷²

7) Now, feelings of uncertainty may arise because: a) the present situation, while frustrating in itself nevertheless offers several equally possible modes of continuation; i.e. the smoker believes that there are several ways of getting a cigarette available to him, one of which will surely enable him to get one. Here, the feeling of suspense is akin to a pleasant, excited sense of apprehension, a heightened awareness of all the possible consequents coupled with a confident expectation that one of them is forthcoming and the present state of tension will thus be resolved. b) Uncertainty may also arise, however, because the present situation is totally unusual and unfamiliar;

i.e. the smoker may realise that there are no cigarettes in the house, that all the stores are closed and so he cannot purchase any. Now, his feeling of suspense is distinctly unpleasant as he realises that he can no longer confidently expect an eventual resolution. Both feelings of suspense are emotive feelings, but the belief that one has some measure of control makes the first one not unpleasant; a corresponding belief in a total lack of control in the second makes it distinctly unpleasant. Here, depending on the situation, extremely unpleasant emotions could occur.⁷³

8) Emotion then is a product of expectation, intrinsically connected with uncertainty.⁷⁴

9) The longer the suspense -- the greater the amount of pent-up energy -- the greater the emotional release upon resolution.⁷⁵

Now, let us consider Meyer's notion of emotion in music:

1) A tone, or group of tones implies, leads us to expect, a more or less specific consequent. Expectation is not a blind, unthinking, conditioned reflex. It involves:

(a) a kind of "fore-knowing"; in order to expect something we must already "know" what it is we expect. Thus, in music a tone or group of tones must have usually resulted in a certain type of consequent and through constant listening (previous experience) this stimulus-response pattern has become ingrained within us as a

habit-response so much so that it now behaves as an automatic response pattern. So, we hear a group of tones and automatically expect a certain type of consequent. Such a system of habit responses, built up and understood by a group of people constitutes what we call style.⁷⁶

Relating this back to our own assimilation of experience: the habit-responses that we acquire through listening to musical styles constitute a kind of musical equivalent of the behavioural habit-responses we acquire through childhood experience.⁷⁷ For example, growing up within Western European culture, we learn that while certain behaviour patterns are acceptable, others are definitely not acceptable. Just so, in acquiring or internalizing a particular musical style we learn to listen in a particular way, i.e. we learn to listen for -- to expect -- certain musical patterns and if these are not forthcoming, we exhibit confusion and uncertainty. Thus, previous experiences both in music and in life have significant effects upon our understanding of a given situation. To relate it back to Organic Form, they imply or partially predict how we will react in certain situations.

(b) Expectation also involves perception. The system of expectations set up by any style can only be assimilated if the relationships within them are clearly perceived and understood. In other words, while scales, modes, harmonies, manner of performance may vary according to the style in question, the ways in which the mind, operating within the

context of culturally established norms, will perceive these patterns, i.e. will select and organize the stimuli presented to it, will always remain constant. At this point, Meyer argues that, in its selection and organization of incoming stimuli into figures and grouping the mind appears to obey certain general laws; these are the laws of perception, cognition and response formulated by the Gestalt School of Psychology ... the psychological laws of mental life.⁷⁸

Relating this back to our own assimilation of experience: the laws of perception, cognition and response constitute those innate factors which as human beings we inevitably bring to bear on every aspect of our experience. In other words, we bring our own inherent natures⁷⁹ to bear on every experiential situation, musical and otherwise. Thus, innate factors, both in music and in life have significant effects upon our understanding of a given situation, i.e. they imply or partially predict how we will react in certain situations.

To sum up: expectation in music, i.e. tendencies, probabilities -- certain types of predictions, is a product both of: 1) the habit responses developed through experience of particular musical styles, and 2) of the modes of human perception, cognition and response. Thus, in musical experience as well as in "life", the mind is made up as it were of a complicated mass of attitudes, habits and tendencies, which determine to a large extent the manner in

which new experiences (musical and otherwise) will be assimilated.⁸⁰

3) If the expected tonal response occurs without delay then, no emotion or affect is aroused; i.e. if the anticipated tone occurs we experience no affective response.

4) If the expected tonal response is delayed or blocked, a feeling of suspense or tension⁸¹ exactly analogous to that described earlier is engendered. Both suspense feelings are products of the same stimulus situation -- apprehension in the face of the unknown. Moreover it is precisely because of their similarity to life experiences that music tensions seem especially powerful and effective.⁸²

What sort of life-experiences is Meyer referring to here? It would seem reasonable to answer, experiences which for some reason or another gave rise to emotional or affective responses. Now, if we reflect upon some of our own experiences which evoked affective responses we will begin to observe that, depending on the extent of the emotional response generated, we have little or no trouble remembering them. In other words, emotion or affect seems to characterize at least in part, those experiences from the past that we remember; and, conversely, a lack of emotional response seems to characterize those experiences which we have forgotten.⁸³ Thus, the normal habitual activities of our day to day experiences -- washing our faces, for example -- we tend to do automatically without thinking about them, and because they are thus automatic

unless something happens to make them stand out in our minds, we forget them relatively quickly after they have occurred. Now, the something which happens to make us remember, Meyer would argue, occurs when the habitual response pattern is disturbed in some way, e.g. when the water is turned off and we find we cannot wash our faces. While the example offered here is somewhat banal, because life exhibits the "oneness" we associate with organic form, presumably this type of response occurs on every level up to and including our most complex emotional experiences. Now, this occurrence of an unanticipated response is what occurs often in music and when the expected musical response pattern fails to materialize we experience a feeling of suspense or tension which Meyer suggests is an emotive feeling. This feeling of tension arises because we don't know what will happen next. In musical terms, when an expected tone does not occur, we are surprised, confused and uncertain as to what new tones will follow the unexpected one. The feelings of uncertainty here, however, are not unpleasant. Rather, they take the form of a kind of heightened awareness, a deeper recognition of alternative modes of continuation, alternatives we are now forced to consider because the expected response has not occurred; and, a kind of excited sense of apprehension as we try to surmise which consequent, out of several possible alternatives, will in fact emerge.⁸⁴

5) The greater the amount of pent-up energy the greater the feelings of emotional release upon resolution. In life, however, tensions frequently go unresolved, are merely dissipated in the press of irrelevant events, at best achieve partial resolution through being "worked off" in sheer physical activity which is without meaningful relation to the original stimulus or tendency. Thus, we frequently "take out" our frustrations about something on something or perhaps somebody else who or which had nothing whatever to do with the original cause of frustration. In music, however, the same stimulus, i.e. the music activates tendencies, inhibits them and later provides meaningful and relevant resolutions.⁸⁵ Music, so provides a totally unified emotional experience, a paradigm of the order and form we would wish our everyday emotions could achieve.

In developing that unity, music compositions may exhibit overall characteristics which bear remarkable resemblance to the stages of growth we see exhibited in living organisms.⁸⁶ For example: a composition which incorporates a great amount of unexpected or unanticipated material will tend to strike the average listener as radical and unusual; moreover, it will require a kind of "growth" on his part in that it requires that he expand his listening habits in order to understand and so perceive possibly new stylistic norms which are being developed. Listeners, of course, are often extremely reluctant to expand thus their listening habits, hence, the art music

of the twentieth century still poses stylistic listening problems for many "average" listeners. In contrast to this, a musical composition may exhibit little new material, i.e. it may "rehash," as it were old stylistic problems and so, in a certain sense, strike more progressive listeners as banal, cliched or simply out of date. In other music compositions, Mozart's for example, a judicious balance is maintained between what constituted traditionally accepted stylistic patterns, and more unanticipated, unexpected patterns which Meyer would suggest are the elements which evoke emotional responses. Here, we see exhibited in musical works the characteristics of radical change, little or no change and a balanced rate of change which were cited as characteristics of living organisms.

Finally, the eventual form of a music composition -- let us say, a sonata -- is not made from without; i.e. a sonata form does not (or at least should not) function as a kind of musical recipe to which one adds ingredients (tones) and thus "constructs" a musical composition.⁸⁷ Rather, according to Meyer, a musical composition while exhibiting a certain permanence of form nevertheless gives rise to that form through a constant series of implied and so expected changes. However, no musical composition evolves in an entirely predictable manner; instead unexpected change occurs to a greater or lesser extent and it is the intricate balancing of the expected and the unexpected, i.e. of tension and resolution which gives rise

to the characteristic forms of musical compositions.⁸⁸

Moreover, it is the unexpected, unanticipated elements which Meyer proposes set up feelings of suspense and tension. Musical suspense, however, seems to have direct analogies in experience in general,⁸⁹ thus the emotional responses generated bear a remarkable resemblance to our day to day experience of emotion.

Our general definition of emotion, then, might now be revised to read as follows:

Affect or emotion-felt is aroused when a tendency to respond, activated by the musical stimulus is temporarily inhibited or permanently blocked.⁹⁰

Or, as Susanne Langer states it:

Music is atonal Analogue of Emotive Life.⁹¹

In summary: the purpose of this chapter was to investigate the creation of musical compositions in order to see if they conformed to the principles of "Organic Form". Two theories were investigated with this purpose in mind, one of which (Susanne K. Langer's) specifically related the creation of art works to the principles of Organic Form. Both theories, however, developed notions of musical creativity which may be easily connected to the aforementioned principles. These notions included:

- 1) The notion of the whole being prior to the parts -- Langer's concept of the musical matrix.
- 2) The notion of an organic form conveying the process of its own development to the observer -- Langer's Commanding Form and Meyer's notion of implication

(expectation) - resolution.

- 3) The notion of assimilation -- Langer's matrix and Meyer's unanticipated consequents.
- 4) The notion of internality -- the "oneness" we associate with organic form, the continual and hierarchical process of tension - resolution.
- 5) The notion of interdependence -- because of the "oneness" every part is essential.

Thus, it might reasonably be argued, on the basis of Meyer's and Langer's theories, that musical compositions do appear to adhere to many of the principles of Organic Form. And, as Lipps and Vokelt cite Organic Form as one of the important characteristics of art works which facilitate acts of *Einfuhlung*, it may reasonably be argued that a musical composition exhibiting such a form can, according to Lipps and Vokelt, facilitate an act of *Einfuhlung* on the performer's part.

In developing the notion of "oneness" we associate with organic form, musical compositions exhibit that unity through the dominance of a certain aspect or quality, cited by Lipps and Vokelt as the third characteristic of art works which facilitate acts of *Einfuhlung*.

L.B. Meyer, in developing his notion of expectation-resolution comes up with a theory of musical emotion which is remarkably similar to our usual experience of emotion in our everyday lives. Thus he inadvertently makes reference to Lipps' and Vokelt's first characteristic of

art works, i.e. that the formal structure (tension-resolution) of a musical composition resembles the structure (tension-resolution) of our own emotional experiences.

Finally, because the musical composition exhibits the form of "living organisms", the emotive feelings perceived therein take on a character of "life" which enables the spectator (or performer) to transcend the barriers of subject and object, to perceive the musical composition as expressive of his own subjective feeling and thus to experience an act of *Einfühlung*.

Footnotes

¹See chapter three, p. 81.

²See chapter two, p. 60.

³See chapter three, p. 104.

⁴See chapter one, p. 21.

⁵As will be seen later, the notion of "growth" (its analogous counterpart in composition would be "creativity") is integral to the concept of organic form.

⁶Susanne K. Langer, Feeling and Form (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd., 1953).

⁷Leonard B. Meyer, Emotion and Meaning in Music (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956).

⁸_____, Music, the Arts and Ideas (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967).

⁹In the same way, in chapter one, p. 1, musical performance was defined as the completion of a musical work, the aspect which carries the musical creation (the composition) through from thought to physical expression.

¹⁰For example in Problems of Art she states:

The elements in a work are always newly created with the total image and although it is possible to analyze what they contribute to the image ... it is not possible to assign them any of its import apart from the whole. That is characteristic of organic form.

in Melvin Rader (ed.), A Modern Book of Aesthetics (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston Inc., 1973).

¹¹Organic form or what is often termed "the ancient principle of organic unity" (De Witt Parker, 1926) has a long and illustrious history in the area of aesthetics. As the concept of "equality or harmony of all parts in relation to the whole," it was developed by the stoics; is frequently referred to by Plato and Aristotle; survived in medieval scholasticism; and featured in Kant's classical ideological definition of the living organism -- "one in which every part is reciprocally means and end". The meaning of organism was then transferred from natural beings to society and to the state, then to law, history and so forth, "organic" becoming a favourite term of the

Romantic school. Here, the word "organic" is used to stand in opposition to "mechanic". A "mechanical" unity exists when the parts of a work are just placed one next to the other and only extrinsically joined, being made to enter in a pre-established framework without any intrinsic connection. An "organic" unity exists when all the parts are interdependent -- each diverse element contributes to the total integration of the unified whole. For a more comprehensive account of the historical usage of "organic form" see G.N. Orsini, "The ancient roots of a Modern Idea" included in G.S. Rousseau (ed.), Organic Form - The Life of an Idea (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1972).

¹²Samuel Taylor Coleridge quoted in Philip C. Ritterbush, "Aesthetics and Objectivity in the study of form in the life sciences" included in G.S. Rousseau (ed.), Organic Form, op. cit., p. 42.

See also Meyer Abrams, The Mirror and the Lamp (London: Oxford University Press, 1953), p. 170-6.

The five properties or principles of organic form are:

1. that of the "Whole", the priority of the whole; without the whole the parts are nothing;
2. that of "Growth", the manifestation of growth in the evolution and extension of the plant;
3. that of "Assimilation"; the plant converts diverse materials into its own substance.
4. that of Internality; the plant is the spontaneous source of its own energy; it is not shaped from without;
5. that of "Interdependence" between parts and parts, and parts and whole; pull off a leaf and it dies.

¹³"Whatever is truly organic and living, the whole is prior to the parts" in Kathleen Coburn, ed., The Philosophical Lectures of Samuel Taylor Coleridge Hitherto Unpublished (New York: Philosophical Library, 1949, p. 196) in Ritterbush, "Aesthetics and Objectivity," op. cit., p. 42.

¹⁴"Productivity or Growth is the first power of living things and it exhibits itself as evolution and extension in the Plant," "Monologues by the Late Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Esq. No. I: Life," Fraser's Magazine for Town and Country XII (1835) p. 492 in Ritterbush, "Aesthetics and Objectivity," op. cit., p. 42.

¹⁵See Coleridge's analogy of the mind, p. of this chapter.

¹⁶"The external aspect of living things is determined by internal processes, not, as in a human artefact, from without," Philip C. Ritterbush, "Aesthetics and Objectivity," op. cit., p. 42.

¹⁷"Imaginative unity is an "organic" unity: a self-evolved system, constituted by a living interdependence of parts, whose identity cannot survive their removal from the whole," Meyer Abrams in Ritterbush, "Aesthetics and Objectivity," op. cit., p. 42.

¹⁸Susanne K. Langer, Feeling and Form, op. cit., p. 121.

¹⁹"Inspiration ... is the impulse which sets creation in movement: it is also the energy which keeps it going. The composer's principal problem is that of recapturing it in every phrase of his work ... of bringing the requisite amount of energy to bear on every detail, as well as, constantly, to his vision of the whole." Roger Sessions, The Intent of the Artist, edited by Augusto Centeno (1941) in Melvin Rader, Modern Aesthetics, op. cit., p. 305.

²⁰Susanne K. Langer, Feeling and Form, op. cit., p. 122.

²¹Paul Hindemith, A Composer's World, Harvard University Press, 1952. pp. 60-63.

²²Susanne K. Langer, Feeling and Form, op. cit. p. 122.

²³See p.117 of this chapter.

²⁴Susanne K. Langer, Feeling and Form, op. cit., p. 122.

²⁵Alice D. Snyder, ed. S.T. Coleridge's Treatise on Method (London: Constable, 1934), p. 7.

²⁶Susanne K. Langer, Feeling and Form, op. cit., p. 122.

²⁷Ibid., p. 126.

²⁸See Philip C. Ritterbush, "Aesthetics and Objectivity," op. cit., p. 42.

²⁹Susanne K. Langer, Feeling and Form, op. cit., p. 127.

³⁰For a poetic rendition of the principles of Organic Form see T.S. Eliot, Four Quartets which are based on Beethoven's last Quartets. Organic Form also made an appearance in many of the other areas of art. For example: Coleridge developed his concept of organic form out of an analysis of Shakespeare's plays, which he held to have been designed from a unified view of human nature. On just the same grounds Friedrich Schlegel had praised Goethe's novel Wilhelm Meister as a perfectly organic work of art wherein

the parts repeated the whole and all elements were inter-dependent. In Jakob Minor, ed., Friedrich Schlegel: Seine prosaischen Jugendschriften, Vienna: C. Konegan, 1906 I quoted in Philip C. Ritterbush, "Aesthetics and Objectivity," op. cit., p. 43.

³¹"As I am by nature always tempted by anything needing prolonged effort, and prone to persist in overcoming difficulties ... the prospect ... greatly attracted me." Igor Stravinsky, Chronicle of My Life (London: Victor Gollancz Ltd., 1963), pp. 185-186.

³²R.R. Reti, The Thematic Process in Music (New York: Macmillan, 1951).

³³See chapter two, p. 60.

³⁴See chapter two, p. 55.

³⁵Susanne K. Langer, Feeling and Form, op. cit., p. 126.

³⁶Ibid., p. 126.

³⁷Ibid., p. 126.

³⁸See the second and third attribute of Organic Form, p.117 of this chapter, and footnote 12.

³⁹See the fourth attribute of Organic Form, p.118 of this chapter and footnote 12.

⁴⁰See the first attribute of Organic Form, p.117 of this chapter and footnote 12.

⁴¹See the third attribute of Organic Form, p.118 of this chapter and footnote 12.

⁴²We also, however, use the notion of growth in situations where an expansion of ideas takes place. Thus if we say "she has really grown this year" we can mean one of two things: 1) she has grown bigger, i.e. taller this year; or, 2) her mind has developed, i.e. she has learnt a lot, encountered and assimilated new ideas. This second meaning may be directly connected to the notion of organic growth.

⁴³Susanne K. Langer, Feeling and Form, op. cit., p. 66.

⁴⁴Ibid., p. 66.

⁴⁵Ibid., p. 66.

⁴⁶Ibid., p. 66.

⁴⁷See Alfred North Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas. New York: The Free Press, 1967.

⁴⁸It is interesting how we view the notion of predictability with regard to people. For example: the notion of complete predictability indicates boredom; on the other hand total unpredictability indicates a kind of irresponsibility. Here the notion of balance is important posing an interesting parallel with the organism's constant aim of permanence of form achieved through a balance of growth and decay.

⁴⁹Susanne K. Langer, Feeling and Form, op. cit., p. 66.

⁵⁰This notion of predictability relates to the first, second and fourth attribute of Organic Form. See p. 117. of this chapter and footnote 12.

⁵¹Susanne K. Langer, Feeling and Form, op. cit., p. 66; also Philip C. Ritterbush, "Aesthetics and Objectivity," op. cit., p. 42.

⁵²Susanne K. Langer, Feeling and Form, op. cit., p. 127.

⁵³See footnotes 7 and 8.

⁵⁴Leonard B. Meyer, Emotion and Meaning in Music, op. cit., pp. 23-32.

⁵⁵_____, Explaining Music (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1973), p. 6; and for his extended account of hierarchic structures, pp. 80-109.

⁵⁶In connection with this Meyer quotes Alfred North Whitehead in saying "what we perceive as the present is the vivid fringe of memory tinged with anticipation" (Ibid., p. 4). It is easy to see how this may be connected to his notion of expectation-resolution.

⁵⁷See p. 115 of this chapter.

⁵⁸Susanne K. Langer, Feeling and Form, op. cit., p. 127.

⁵⁹Leonard B. Meyer, Emotion and Meaning in Music, op. cit., pp. 13-23. Here, he includes an extensive review of the theory of emotion he wishes to accept, citing relevant writers' works, etc.

⁶⁰Ibid., p. 14.

⁶¹See Lipps' and Vokelt's first characteristic that an art work should exhibit in order to facilitate an act of Einfuhlung, Chapter two, p. 60 of this thesis.

⁶²Leonard B. Meyer, Emotion and Meaning in Music, op. cit., pp. 16-20.

⁶³Ibid., p. 14.

⁶⁴See chapter three, p. 81 of this thesis.

⁶⁵See chapter two, p. 41 of this thesis.

⁶⁶Susanne K. Langer, Problems of Art in Melvin Rader, ed., A Modern Book of Aesthetics.

⁶⁷Leonard B. Meyer, Emotion and Meaning in Music, op. cit., pp. 13-14.

⁶⁸Ibid., p. 14.

⁶⁹Ibid., p. 13.

⁷⁰Ibid., p. 14.

⁷¹Ibid., p. 14. Meyer thus describes an emotive feeling in terms of tension or suspense within the body. Interestingly Langer, in Feeling and Form, op. cit., p. 372 states: "That life of feeling is a stream of tensions and resolutions. Probably all emotion, all feeling, tone, mood and even personal "sense of life" or "sense of identity" is a specialized and intricate, but definite interplay of tensions -- actual, nervous and muscular tensions taking place in a human organism." Thus, her definition of "feeling" is not that far removed from Meyer's concept of emotion.

⁷²Leonard B. Meyer, Emotion and Meaning, op. cit., p. 15.

⁷³"It is the control which is believed to exist over the situation which distinguishes pleasant from unpleasant emotions," Ibid., p. 20. Contrast the sensation of falling through space with a parachute which one believes will enable one to reach the ground in safety; and the sensation of falling without one.

⁷⁴Ibid., p. 27.

⁷⁵Ibid., p. 28.

⁷⁶Ibid., p. 30; also p. 61.

⁷⁷See p. 132 of this chapter.

⁷⁸For Meyer's extensive account of how the Laws of Pattern Perception may apply to music: see Emotion and Meaning in Music, op. cit., Chapters three, four, and five. Also, Explaining Music, Part Two: "Implications in Tonal Melody," op. cit., pp. 109-268.

⁷⁹See p. 132 of this chapter.

⁸⁰See p. 132 of this chapter.

⁸¹See p. 139 of this chapter.

⁸²Leonard B. Meyer, Emotion and Meaning in Music, op. cit., p. 28.

⁸³Here, we must point out some interesting parallels with some notions mentioned earlier in this chapter: 1) just as in life we point to our remembered situations as "changing" us in some significant way; so, too, the unexpected and so emotionally evocative musical patterns in music bring about "change" -- they do not follow previously implied indications; 2) Meyer also suggests that we only "remember" those parts of a music composition which appeared significant or emotionally affective; other totally predictable parts we "forget". There is an obvious connection here to our own remembered or forgotten experiences.

⁸⁴In Music, The Arts and Ideas, op. cit., chapter one, Meyer connects the heightened awareness of uncertainty to some of the central notions of information theory. Here, he argues that the "psycho-stylistic conditions which give rise to musical meaning, whether affective or intellectual are the same as those which communicate information".

⁸⁵Leonard B. Meyer, Emotion and Meaning, op. cit., p. 31.

⁸⁶See p. 132 of this chapter.

⁸⁷See Charles Rosen, The Classical Style (London: W.W. Norton and Co. Inc., 1972).

⁸⁸Ibid.

⁸⁹"It makes us feel something of the insignificance and powerlessness of man in the face of the inscrutable workings

of destiny.... Similarly, in music the state of suspense involves an awareness of the powerlessness of man in the face of the unknown." Leonard B. Meyer, Emotion and Meaning, op. cit., pp. 28-29.

⁹⁰Ibid., p. 31.

⁹¹Susanne K. Langer, Feeling and Form, op. cit., p. 27.

V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

The intention in writing this thesis was to investigate the art of music in performance, more specifically the nature of the relationship which exists between the musical composition and the performer-musician; and, to ask was there an aesthetic theory or theories which could be said to explain, or least offer some insight into this rather unique relationship?

It was posited that such a theory did indeed exist. Accordingly, the central hypothesis of this thesis proposed that one theory of aesthetic experience -- the theory of *Einfuhlung* -- has particular relevance for the art of music in performance. *Einfuhlung*, "the act whereby we bestow on things our own soul and its moods" provides a satisfactory explanation for the creative dimension which the performer brings to musical compositions.

Since our intention was to connect the art of music in performance and *Einfuhlung* theory, our initial investigations focused on musical performance itself. Here, it was suggested that performance constituted the completion of a musical work -- the aspect which carries it forward from potential sound into live actual sound. However, in taking a musical work and "actualizing" its potential sound structures, a performer does more than simply reproduce in live actual sound, the notes written on

the music score. He adds a creative dimension, i.e. he brings to life through his own imagination and sensitivity the potential sound structures presented in the music score. But, while a performer thus adds an element of personal creativity to the musical work, nevertheless, performance can never, and must never, be seen as completely subjective. For the performer is always, more or less, (depending on the style of the composition played) limited to the musical structures already created by the composer. Now, these musical structures are designed in such a way as to somehow facilitate the performer's creative sense, enabling him to bring them to life through his own creative imagination. In connection with this it was suggested that music compositions exhibit characteristics which all musicians, be they composers, performers or listeners, are capable of understanding. Thus, it was indicated that musical works, on the most fundamental level, structure musical sounds in some way; that they exhibit, in so doing, various kinds of structural patterns (i.e. styles) which have come to be accepted and understood by certain cultures; that, working more, or possibly less, within the parameters of certain of these musical styles -- (or possibly even creating a new one) -- that they exhibit an individual creative dimension which may be traced back directly to the composer him or herself, a creative "dimension" which "expresses" them in some way or another.

All of these characteristics place limitations on the amount or type of personal, subjective contribution which the performer can make to the music. Thus, on the most fundamental level, he must perceive the basic structuring of sounds which the work exhibits; he must be familiar (or make himself familiar) with the stylistic patterns which the work will incorporate within itself; finally, he must make a serious effort to understand what it is the composer was attempting to express in the work, and do his utmost to convey or communicate that "expression" to the listener or audience.

Now, in seeking to explicate how performers come to understand composer's "expressions", it was suggested that in music written between 1700-1900, that which was expressed in music was the subjective experience of the composer, i.e. his emotions and feelings. However, while it was agreed that music compositions express emotion, it was suggested that the emotions expressed therein are emotions common to us all, emotions which the performer too, as a "common" man can know and understand and to which he can respond in a personal, meaningful way. But, in so doing, the performer has to constantly bear in mind that it is the "common" emotions expressed in the musical work that he is endeavouring to actualize, not his own personal emotions and feelings. While these personal emotions may help him to actualize the emotions expressed in the work, they must never take it over, i.e. the performer must always direct

his personal feelings and emotions towards enlivening the musical composition, in that sense performance involves a kind of selflessness, a going beyond one's personal emotions to those of humanity as a whole.

The process of "enlivening" a musical work, however, involves adding an element of "life" to it, more specifically, an element of actual live feeling or emotion. Thus, it was suggested that, contrary to some opinions, this emotional response be made during the actual performance with the essential limitation that it be evoked by, directed towards and concentrated within the composition itself and, moreover, that peripheral indications (i.e. facial gestures, etc.) of this emotional response were acceptable as long as they both derived from and were related to the music; indeed, that these could even help the listener to understand what was being expressed.

Having investigated musical performance, our next chapter undertook to examine the theory of *Einfühlung* itself. Here, many elements emerged which could be said to relate to musical performance: 1) The meaning of the word "*Einfühlung*" -- feeling into -- could be used to describe the performer's emotional response to the music composition. Thus, one could speak, with validity, of a performer "feeling his way into" a musical composition. 2) Because the theory of *Einfühlung* does not characterize this "feeling into" as totally subjective, but rather insists that the object of perception, i.e. that which is

being felt into, determines to a large extent the nature of that "feeling into"; it may be related to musical performance where, as we have seen, the musical composition itself places within definite limitations the amount or type of personal creativity a performer may contribute to a particular work.

3) The theory of *Einfuhlung* suggests that the "feeling into", i.e. the projection of emotions into a work occurs spontaneously and immediately; just so, in performance it was suggested that a performer respond to the music as he hears it, i.e. during the actual performance.

4) In what was described as the most problematic aspect of the theory, *Einfuhlung* suggested that so complete and immediate was the act of projection, that it overcame the barrier between subject and object making them appear as one reality. Thus, it was stated, one could "live" the object. Just so, in performance, we suggested, the performer perceives the musical works as being so expressive of emotional life and feeling that he throws himself, heart and soul, into the act of playing.

5) *Einfuhlung* also suggested that the act of projection may be accompanied by certain bodily gestures which, while not in any way essential, nevertheless indicate the nature of the emotions projected; so too, in performance, it was argued that peripheral facial gestures for example, were acceptable as long as they related not to personal emotions, but to those expressed by the musical composition.

Finally: 6) Einfuhlung suggested four characteristics which an art work, e.g. a musical composition, should exhibit in order to promote an act of Einfuhlung; our purpose for the remaining chapters of the thesis then was to examine these characteristics in order to see if they were exhibited in musical compositions; assuming they were, to argue thus that, within the limitations set up by the theory itself, performance could be explained in terms of Einfuhlung; and, to shed hopefully some insight into the contribution which the composition makes to the relationship between performer and musical work.

Focusing on the first characteristic that Einfuhlung suggested an art work should exhibit, i.e. that the art work exhibit a unity of form and content; we included and investigated a theory of art which, it was argued, had particular relevance to the notion being considered. Thus, we examined Susanne K. Langer's theory that art works, e.g. musical compositions "symbolize" human feeling. Once again, our investigation uncovered many aspects which could be seen to relate to Einfuhlung, the most important being that musical structures bear a remarkable resemblance to the forms of feeling. While the exact nature of this resemblance is not without problems, and while Langer uses the notion of symbolism in a rather unusual way, nevertheless, the theory did shed some insight into how the dynamic structure of the content, i.e. the structure of human feeling, could sufficiently resemble the formal structure

of the object, i.e. the musical structures of the composition, that one could easily perceive the musical composition as being expressive of human feeling. Hence, it could be argued that a performer intuitively recognizing this important similarity so responds emotionally to the work under consideration.

However, while posing that this similarity exists, Langer insists that its function in music is primarily cognitive; i.e. the musical structures as "symbols" (in her peculiar sense) of human feeling present our subjective life of feeling for contemplation, recognition, and most of all, understanding. In other words, musical structures through exhibiting not actual "felt" feeling, but rather the properties or "look" of feeling enable us to experience the subjective realm objectively. Here, we may now begin to understand, why a performer cannot let his own personal feelings take over. For, in situations where this occurs, he no longer concentrates on the music and so loses contact with those musical structures by means of which he may move beyond purely personal expression into another realm where not alone he but any sensitive listener can experience in an objective, reflective manner the forms of human feeling. Because the objective presentation of human feeling incorporated within a music composition, is available and accessible to any sensitive listener, when a performer, concentrating entirely on the music, enters that realm, he may justifiably be said to expand his consciousness from his

own personal concerns to that of humanity as a whole, a notion which Vokelt proposed as the fourth characteristic of art-works which facilitate an act of *Einfuhlung*.

In presenting the forms of human feeling for objective recognition and understanding, however, musical compositions do so in overall forms which manifest a unity amidst variety, a "oneness" which we associate with organic form. Since Lipps and Vokelt cite as the second characteristic of art works which facilitate *Einfuhlung* the notion that they should present themselves as "organic" wholes, in our last chapter we focused on "organic form" seeking to relate it to the overall form exhibited in musical compositions. In connection with this, we explored the notion of musical compositions developing through a constant cumulative hierarchical process of implications (expectations) and then eventual resolution, a process which may be related to the constant, cumulative process of implied stages of growth whereby living organisms experience their "life". In developing this notion, moreover, a second theory was introduced, one which developed a theory of emotion in music which was based on the notion of expectation-resolution. This was Leonard B. Meyer's theory of emotion in music which suggested that in our everyday lives emotion is aroused when there is an interval interposed between the arousal of a tendency or desire and its fulfillment; and, that musical compositions incorporating as they do conventionally accepted stylistic patterns, set up musical

tendencies, which the composer chooses to inhibit (thus awakening our emotions). They postpone, moreover, the satisfaction of our expectations and so increase the tension. Eventually, all is made well, and tension is dissipated by the provision of an expected solution. Now, in arguing that musical compositions set up emotional situations which bear a remarkable resemblance to the emotional situations we experience throughout our day to day existence, Meyer offers yet another explanation of Lipps' and Vokelt's unity of form and content. Hence, it could be argued, that a performer, intuitively recognizing this resemblance, perceives the music composition as expressive of human emotion and so responds emotionally to it. Here again, however, we notice the limitations which the composition places on the performer, for according to Meyer, it is the perceived stylistic patterns which set up the musical tendencies or expectations. It follows accordingly that in order to perceive the inhibition of these tendencies, the performer has first to be aware of the tendencies themselves, i.e. he has to know and understand the musical style. Here, we see a possible explanation as to why performers must take into account the various conventions of musical styles. For, assuming that Meyer is correct, if the stylistic patterns are not clearly understood and presented, i.e. actualized in sound, the inhibitions of those patterns whereby emotion is aroused will not achieve effective utterance. Thus, an effective presentation of emotion will

be rendered impossible.

Finally, because musical compositions exhibit the "oneness" of form characteristic of "living" organisms, (thereby incorporating Lipps' and Vokelt's third characteristic -- Unity through the dominance of a certain aspect --) the forms of feeling presented therein, achieve a quality of "life" which makes them seem almost "alive". Moreover, it is this quality of "life" which the performer intuitively recognizes and to which he cannot help but respond. But, in responding thus to the life of feeling presented in the musical composition, the performer may become so involved in that perceived life of feeling that he actually begins to "live" it. In other words, the barrier between subject (i.e. the performer) and object (i.e. the musical work) is destroyed, and both performer and composition appear as one reality. The life of feeling presented in the musical work "becomes" the performer's life; the performer projects his life of feeling into the music thereby enlivening it, i.e. an act of *Einfuhlung* occurs.

In final summary: it is argued in this thesis that musical performance may be explained in terms of the theory of *Einfuhlung*. In arguing thus, it is recognized that this thesis constitutes only a preliminary investigation of this notion. For example, the metaphysical system developed by A.N. Whitehead could have important implications for the theory of *Einfuhlung*, implications which have not been pursued here in this thesis. Also, while *Einfuhlung* may have

relevance for the performance of music written between 1750-1900, what of the music of the twentieth century? Is there a theory which goes beyond Einfuhlung and explains in a meaningful way the performance of twentieth century music?

Postscript: The term "Einfuhlung" as used in this thesis may give rise to the notion of "Einfuhlung" as a single relatively fixed concept. In fact, the term itself has undergone at least two stages of development and several shifts in emphasis. The writer is aware of these but for reasons of space and unity did not deal with them in this thesis.

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

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APPENDIX

Appendix: Carroll C. Pratt's two meaningless forms:



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